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ABSTRACT
In June 1996, the US and Mexican press announced a unique partnership that sought to address
the dramatic housing shortage in Ciudad JuAirez, Mexico. This public-private partnership involved
construction companies, a major US multinational corporation, and the national Mexican housing
agency. General Motors and its subsidiary, Delphi Automotive, formed a partnership with
INFONAVIT, the Mexican worker-housing agency, that would provide 7000 housing credits to
Delphi employees in 7 Mexican cities. Grupo Condak, a Mexican construction company, would
build the homes with the financial backing of Pulte Mortgage Company, the largest US
homebuilder at the time.
The Mexican government has attracted foreign direct investment through the maquiladora
program because of low labor costs due not only to low wages, but also because of low levels of
employee benefits. Why then, would a foreign company voluntarily choose to increase employee
benefits, implicitly as a substitute for increasing wages? This thesis will analyze the underlying
incentive structure that brought about this unique housing partnership, and ultimately examine if
this program is a desirable way of mitigating worker housing shortages in Mexico. Analyzing
how the benefits of the program accrue to different actors sheds some light on the motives for
starting the program. Although an evaluation of the program is not the main purpose of this
thesis, this study will examine the benefits of housing program from the perspective of all
participants.
In particular, this research examines the incentives that prompted General Motors to offer
housing benefits. If Employer-assisted housing is to be replicable, and if there is a future for
other public-private partnerships in social interest housing, then understanding the firm's motives
for participating in such a program is of critical importance. There are two mainstream
hypotheses of why a private firm like Delphi might offer housing benefits. The reduction of
employee turnover and associated training costs are the main reasons that Delphi Automotive
cites as its incentives for starting the program. Additionally, the desire to generate a positive
corporate image and the importance of public relations is a second prominent theory. This
research will also examine more closely two alternative hypotheses on the motives of General
Motors and Delphi Automotive in offering employer-assisted housing benefits in Mexico: 1) to
discourage labor organizing in Mexico and to counteract the US labor force's anti-Mexico
propaganda and 2) external pressure from the construction industry and US sources of capital
interested in using Mexican government subsidies to create housing markets in Mexico.
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Diane E. Davis
Thesis Reader: Dr. Anna Hardman
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PROLOGUE
When I began exploring potential thesis topics, I became intrigued by the June 2001 issue of Time
magazine that featured stories about the Nueva Frontera of the US-Mexico border. I soon began
investigating a story about an innovative housing program in Ciudad Juirez, Mexico, the sister city
of El Paso, Texas. I quickly became hooked on the idea of employer-assisted housing in low-
income communities in Mexico. I started looking at the housing program from the perspective that
public-private partnerships have a real opportunity to address worker-housing shortages in Mexico.
However, what started out as a story about access to credit for low-income housing, really turned
into a story about creating profitable housing markets for large multinational corporations.
Originally, I thought my research could explore the outcome of the Delphi housing program and
look at ways to encourage more US maquiladoras to become involved in housing programs for their
workers. However, I soon began to question the motives of a profit-motivated firm that voluntarily
chose to offer employee benefits, when most firms relocate to Mexico to lower labor costs.
Throughout the past year, my research carried me through numerous hypotheses on GM's motives
for starting the program. The firm's stated purpose was to reduce employee turnover. The other
obvious hypothesis was that GM wanted to improve its public image and generate positive public
relations, particularly given the recent anti-NAFTA attacks on US firms operating in Mexico.
My research evolved after speaking with activists in the labor community, and I became convinced
that GM had started this program as a means to control labor and prevent unionization in Mexico. I
initially suspected that maquiladoras were re-creating the industrial company town, similar to the
Pullman Company town in Pullman, Illinois. My suspicions about Mexican labor unions turned out
to be incorrect, or at least unsubstantiated. To the contrary, the Mexicans I met in Ciudad Juirez
had little consciousness of labor movements. However, I did make some interesting conclusions
about the transnational effects of US and Canadian labor unions and their effect on Mexican labor.
The interesting story that 1 did uncover was that what appeared to be a story about low-income
housing, was really a story about how American financial companies used Mexican government
subsidies to assist their entry into the Mexican housing market. In 1994, NAFTA legislation forced
the liberalization of Mexico's financial sector. This was an open door for US sources of capital
interested in Mexico's housing sector. Furthermore, diversified MNCs like General Motors found
that they could supplement their primary activities in automobiles and trucks, and invest in financial
markets through their mortgage subsidiary, GMAC-RFC.
In a large corporation like GM, different actors were motivated by different incentives, and there
was a confluence of factors that allowed this program to emerge. Exploring the different motives of
the various factors has been an interesting journey with numerous twists and turns, but ultimately,
General Motors behaved in a predictable manner, and what appeared to be a "low-income" housing
program was really just business as usual.
Rossana Dudziak
Cambridge, MA
May 7, 2002
Chapter 1
Introduction: Housing and Maquiladoras in Mexico
In June 1996, the US and Mexican press announced a unique partnership that sought to
address the dramatic housing shortage in Ciudad JuArez, Mexico. This public-private partnership
involved construction companies, a major US multinational corporation, and the national
Mexican housing agency. General Motors and its subsidiary, Delphi Automotive, formed a
partnership with INFONAVIT, the Mexican worker-housing agency, that would provide 7000
housing credits to Delphi employees in seven cities in northern Mexico. Grupo Condak, a
Mexican construction company, would build the homes with the financial backing of Pulte
Mortgage Company, the largest US homebuilder at the time.
The Delphi housing program was to assist its employees in securing government-
subsidized housing and to provide down payment assistance for up to 7000 houses. This was a
program that was intended to help Delphi's employees gain access to formal sector mortgages.
Additionally, it was intended to help alleviate the pressure on informal housing in the colonias, the
self-built shantytowns where many of the maquiladora workers live.
The Mexican government has attracted foreign direct investment through the
maquiladora program because of low labor costs due not only to low wages, but also because of
low levels of employee benefits. Why then, would a foreign company voluntarily choose to
increase employee benefits, implicitly as a substitute for increasing wages? One of the originating
questions of this thesis is familiar to many academic researchers specializing in labor issues:
"Under what conditions do private firms act for the public good?" Under what conditions did
Delphi and its parent, General Motors, decide to offer progressive worker housing benefits?
This thesis will analyze the underlying incentive structure that brought about this unique
housing partnership, and ultimately examine if this program is a desirable way of mitigating
worker housing shortages in Mexico. Analyzing how the benefits of the program accrue to
different actors sheds some light on the motives for starting the program. This research will look
at the outcomes of the program but is not an evaluation. Rather, I will explore the incentives that
prompted a multinational corporation to offer employee-housing benefits in Mexico, and to see if
this is a sustainable and replicable housing program.
General Motors is the world's largest auto manufacturer, operating manufacturing
facilities in 30 different countries, and employing 362,000 people worldwide. In 2001, GM
reported $177.3 billion in sales and sold more than 8.5 million cars and trucks'. In addition to
auto manufacturing, GM also operates one of the largest financial services companies, GMAC,
which offers automotive, mortgage, and business financing and insurance services.
Until 1999, GM owned Delphi Automotive, the largest autopart manufacturer in the
world in the $720 billion-a-year industry. (Blumenstein & Stern, 1996) In 1999, Delphi posted
sales of $29.1 billion, making Delphi three times larger than its nearest competitor. Delphi
employs 179,000 workers worldwide and in 1998, Delphi had 53 plants in Mexico, and employed
72,000 workers, making Delphi the largest private sector employer in Mexico. Delphi's presence
in Ciudad Judrez is also significant with 15 plants and 23,000 employees in this border city.
Why did Delphi-GM2 decide to offer this lucrative employee benefit and is Delphi's
employer assisted housing program a desirable one for workers and for employers? As has
already been mentioned, most US companies relocate to Mexico precisely because they want
lower labor costs. Of all manufacturing production costs, labor is the only factor that is cheaper
in Mexico than it is in the United States. Shipping, telecommunications, real estate, energy, and
the costs of capital are all more expensive in Mexico, making labor costs a critical factor for
companies considering relocation to Mexico.3
In the theoretical world, this is an interesting conundrum because many economists
would argue that Delphi is not behaving in a profit-maximizing manner, and is defying the
pattern set by other multinational corporations that relocate to the developing world to reduce
labor costs. In the policy world, this is an equally interesting question, because by analyzing
Delphi's behavior, policy analysts might search for ways to encourage more private sector actors
to follow Delphi's lead. If expanding public-private partnerships can generate real solutions for
Mexico's housing crisis, then the program has lessons not just for the municipality of Ciudad
Judrez, but also for Mexico as a whole. Furthermore, defining the conditions under which
private firms do positive things for workers has applications around the world.
' Company web site, http://www.gm.com/company/corp-info/profiles/
2 I have used Delphi and GM interchangeably in this paper because General Motors was Delphi's parent
company when the program was initiated in 1996, and according to Delphi executives, the program would not
have been possible without its parent. However, the two companies split in 1999, but General Motors remains
Delphi's number one client, purchasing over 80% of Delphi's autoparts.
3 From TeamNafta.com, an organization that gathers information on Mexican industrial cities for US clients.
1.1 Border Industrialization and the Rise of Maquiladoras
In 1965, the Mexican government established the Border Industrialization Program (BIP)
as a means of encouraging US companies to relocate to the Mexican border. Antonio Bermddez,
a resident of Ciudad Juairez, provided the inspiration for this program and gained support for the
program with President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.
The benefits of the Border Industrialization Program (what would eventually become
known as the maquila4 program) for US multinational corporations: 1) Access to cheap labor in
Mexico 2) Lower manufacturing costs in Mexico 3) Modern buildings and infrastructure in
Mexico that were higher quality than that offered in other developing countries at the time 4) The
BIP removed restrictions requiring sole Mexican ownership, which was attractive for
multinational corporations and 5) US firms "could not only enjoy, but also control the corporate
investment throughout the border region." (Soden, 1999, emphasis added)
Similarly, the Border Industrialization Program had to realize benefits for Mexico to be
sustainable and to be accepted politically. The program sought to attract foreign direct
investment, which would stimulate industrial growth. The three main objectives of the program
for Mexico's industrialization process were: 1) Solve the unemployment problem 2) Generate
foreign exchange and 3) To attract foreign capital and technology. (Soden, 1999)
Since the inception of the maquiladora program in Mexico, hundreds of companies have
relocated to Mexico to take advantage of the tax benefits, lower labor costs, and ultimately reduce
overall production costs to maximize the firms' profits. In recent years, and in particular since the
NAFTA debate, labor economists and activists concerned with the quality of life of Mexican
workers are increasingly interested in the relocation of US firms to Mexico.
1.2 Theoretical Approaches
In addition to the specifics of the maquiladora growth in Mexico, there is a broader
literature on industrial relocation to developing countries. There are four alternative theoretical
approaches that can be used as framework for examining Delphi's decision to relocate to Mexico.
The focus of this thesis is not to analyze the motives of Delphi Automotive and General Motors
4 The terms maquila and maquiladora are used interchangeably to refer to Mexico's export promotion industries
located primarily along the US-Mexico border. The terms are derived from the Spanish term maquilar meaning
"to retain a portion of flour in payment for milling wheat." The modern day analogy refers to Mexican
maquiladoras as processors of imported goods, which are then re-exported to the original producer to be re-sold.
(Peia-Villaseior, 1994)
in relocating to Mexico, but these theories have implications for the firm's behavior. Analyzing
the motives for relocating plants to Mexico is useful because it reveals something about the firms'
preferences and ultimately, the incentives that may have influenced the company's decision to
offer its employees housing benefits.
Starting with Neoclassical microeconomics, the theory of profit-maximization predicts
that firms will relocate to areas with lower production costs. As seen in the description of the
Border Industrialization Program, lower manufacturing costs in Mexico were used to lure foreign
companies to the border region.
A second popular theory that explains firms' relocations to developing countries is the
new international division of labor theory, which emerged to explain the 1970s de-
industrialization of developed economies and the concomitant industrialization of developing
countries. This theory draws on empirical evidence from companies from the United States,
Germany, and Japan who relocated labor-intensive manufacturing activities to low-wage regions
in the developing world including Mexico and Southeast Asia. Developed countries are not only
characterized by high wages of industrial labor, but are also characterized by high rates of
unionization (Carrillo, 1994, p.2 1) which typically add pressure to wages and benefits associated
with labor.
Proponents of the new division of labor theory cite three reasons for this significant
change of the international economy which is promoting industrialization in the developing
world: surplus labor in developing countries, fragmentation of the production process, and
technological improvements that have lowered communication, transportation and freight costs.
(Frobel, et al, 1981) All of these characteristics can also be applied to Mexico's Border
Industrialization Program.
The third dominant theory on industrialization in developing countries is Raymond
Vernon's product cycle theory of 1966. Vernon shows how a product's life cycle corresponds
with different economic phases. From 1948 to the mid 1950s, new products were created for the
mass market by companies characterized as pioneers. During the second phase, 1951-1960, US
companies began exporting primarily to Europe. During the third phase, pioneering companies
see a decline in their oligopolistic markets. The fourth stage, called the maturity stage, occurs in
the 1970s when oligopolies compete against each other in the North American market. Japan
and several Western European countries have by this time recovered from World War II and are
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actively competing in the world markets. This competition drives a de-industrialization of the
regions that were originally "pioneers" and relocation to low wage regions.
The fourth theoretical framework is a Mexico-specific analysis that rejects the mainstream
theories on industrialization and highlights Mexico's unique comparative advantages, vis-a-vis
other developing countries. Although the new international division of labor and the product
cycle theory are powerful ideas that can explain some of the capital movements and de-
industrialization of the 1970s, they are insufficient in explaining Mexico's industrialization
process and its special comparative advantages in attracting multinational companies to Mexico.
Dombois notes that neither of these theories can explain the relocation of capital-intensive
industries, such as the automobile industry in Mexico. (Dombois, 1985, p. 12) Perhaps more
importantly, labor costs as a percentage of overall production costs have declined dramatically.
(Dombois, 1985) When these factors are taken into account, why do multinational firms relocate
to Mexico?
A strong argument can be made that the Mexican government's policy on promoting
export-led development has been a major impetus in luring MNCs to Mexico. Multinational
corporations have benefited from government subsidies, financing assistance, and infrastructure
provision have all been active policies of the Mexican government to encourage foreign direct
investment. (Carrillo, 1994) Previous literature cites Mexican government subsidies and other
incentives as major factors influencing foreign direct investment. (enkins, 1984; Carrillo, 1994)
Mexican scholar Jorge Carrillo also tries to ascertain if it is transnational corporations and the
international economy that is defining Mexican industrialization or if it is the Mexican
government that controls these policies. (Carrillo, 1994, p. 27) Carrillo poses the question of
whether low-wage labor or Mexican government subsidies are the principle comparative
advantage that motivates firms to relocate to Mexico.
Other scholars have quantified the Mexican government's assistance to overseas
companies. Rhys Jenkins analyzed a large automobile manufacturer and shows that "Mexico has
a decisive cost advantage over the US and Japan, resulting from subsidies and financial
concessions offered by the Mexican government." Uenkins, 1984, p. 50) This thesis argues that
Delphi Automotive and General Motors are examples of companies that were able to benefit from Mexican
government subsidies to prosper in the marketplace - both in the automobile industy, a traditional maquiladora,
and in the housing sector, an industry that has not typicaly attracted foreign investment. Furthermore, this work
examines diversified MNC's expansion in Mexico and focuses on the heavily subsidized housing sector as a new
pathforforeign investment.
1.3 Mexico's Housing Shortage
Mexico is a country of 100 million people that has experienced rapid industrialization in
the 1990s. A growing percentage of its population is employed in the formal sector, in particular
along the US-Mexico border. In 1995, Mexico's Secretary of Social Development (SEDESOL)
estimated that Mexico had a housing shortage of 4.6 million units, and by the year 2000, the
country would need to produce 750,000 new units annually. This housing shortage has been
exacerbated by the explosive population growth along the US-Mexico border. Although housing
is scarce and under-serviced across Mexico in general, Ciudad Juirez has been severely affected
by a recent population boom associated with the rapid growth in the maquiladora industry.
Ciudad Juarez experienced a 52.6% growth in population from 1990-2000, as Mexican workers
moved to the border in search of jobs. Estimates show that the city is at least 70,000 units short,
and thousands of more workers live in shantytowns on the edge of the desert town.
Mexico's housing shortage has not gone unnoticed. All levels of Mexican government
and several political parties have become actively involved in promoting "social housing." This
term is widely used in Mexico in reference to low-income housing. INFONAVIT, Instituto
Nacional del Fondo de la Vivienda de los Trabajadores, the federal government's worker housing
agency, is a major player in providing financing at subsidized rates for Mexican workers. FOVI,
Fondo de Operacidn y Financiamento Bancario para la Vivienda, or Fund for the Operation of Bank
Housing Finance, is another federal housing agency that provides financing for Mexican workers,
ostensibly for workers who cannot qualify for commercial mortgages, but earn too much money
to qualify for INFONAVIT subsidized homes. It is not just the government that has become
interested in this market. The private sector has quickly recognized the potential profits in
Mexico's housing market, particularly by taking advantage of government programs.
Private sector banking has had a difficult time competing with the subsidized interest
rates of the Mexican government housing agencies, but the increasing demand for housing has
forced INFONAVIT and FOVI to seek private sector involvement in housing finance. The
increased demand for housing and the inability of the Mexican government to single-handedly
provide subsidized housing for 100 million Mexicans has increased cooperation between Mexican
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housing agencies and the private sector. The private sector's interest in this growing market and
NAFTA legislation which liberalized Mexico's financial markets have all contributed to growing
cooperation between the public and private sector housing institutions in Mexico.
1.4 Employer-assisted housing
Employer-assisted housing remains rare in the United States and other market
economies, and is more common today to specific sectors like mines, agriculture, universities, or
hospitals. Employers might provide housing in areas where the workplace is immobile (mines or
agriculture) and housing is scarce. Alternatively, universities and hospitals offer housing benefits
to attract highly skilled professionals to areas where housing is scarce and expensive5. For these
types of EAH, there is an easy economic rationale for offering housing benefits.
In contrast, the Delphi labor pool does not display these characteristics. In Delphi's case,
it appears that housing is parallel to other worker benefits, as opposed to other instances of EAH
where the emphasis was actually on housing. Housing analysts note that employers offer EAH
primarily to address "job-housing imbalances and compete for workers in a tight labor market."
(Carr, 2000, p. 16) In the early 1990s, there was a tight labor market in Ciudad Jusrez. However,
the housing imbalance can be better described as one in whichformal sector housing was scarce, and
difficulty gaining access to credit made mortgages inaccessible for most workers. Delphi's
housing program is therefore unique when compared to previous housing programs that were
facilitated by employers, because informal solutions to the housing market imbalance have been
accepted for years. Unlike many other instances of EAH in which employers must provide
housing to attract workers, Delphi did not have to offer housing benefits to lure Mexican
workers to the border.
Similarly, there is a literature on employers who provide housing for their workers, but
Delphi Automotive's program does not fit easily into any of these strands of literature. The
literature on Employer-assisted housing is idiosyncratic, ranging from discussions of the Pullman
company town (Adelman, 1977; Harding, 1951; Lindsey, 1942) to housing in industrial towns
(Mosher, 1995) and mining towns (Kluger, 1970). More recently, there has been an equally
sporadic interest in housing for migrant workers, (Chia, 1981; Fassil, 1998) in particular housing
5 Harvard University and Yale University are two examples.
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for agricultural workers. Although I will reference some literature on EAH in the body of the
thesis, most of the theoretical background for this research does not refer to housing literature.
1.5 Structure of Thesis
This thesis will examine four hypotheses that might explain why Delphi Automotive
chose to offer an employee-assisted housing program in 1996. Chapter 2 provides a descriptive
summary of the housing program, how it got started, the employee selection process, and the
mechanics of INFONAVIT and FOVI housing finance. This descriptive chapter will detail who
were the real beneficiaries of the program.
In Chapter 3, I examine two conventional views of why a private firm might offer socially
responsible housing benefits for employees: reducing employee turnover and positive public
relations. Reducing employee turnover is ostensibly Delphi's objective for initiating the housing
benefits, but I will discuss why this explanation is unsatisfactory and how statistics on turnover
reduction can be misinterpreted. Additionally, this chapter will examine the overwhelming
response from the media. After the media extravaganza over NAFTA and Ross Perot's
campaign against sending jobs south of the border, positive press coverage of General Motors'
business practices in Mexico were sorely needed.
In Chapter 4, I examine the hypothesis that housing benefits were offered to counter
propaganda of American labor groups protesting GM's relocations to Mexico. This chapter
draws on literature that shows how housing can be used as a means of control of labor, recalling
episodes of company towns. Furthermore, an analysis of General Motors' labor relations in the
United States and the debilitating effect of strikes will show how GM and Delphi Automotive
had a vested interest in preventing legitimate unionization in Mexico. Additionally, the
distribution of houses shows that areas with low levels of unionization received a
disproportionate amount of housing benefits, while unionized General Motors' plants were not
included in the housing program. 6
Increasing employee retention, reducing training costs associated with high turnover,
improving the company's corporate image, and discouraging the formation of militant labor
unions have all been identified as potential reasons for Delphi Automotive to offer employee-
6 Housing need varies in different cities, but since low-income housing is scarce in most areas of Mexico, need
alone does not explain the distribution of housing benefits across Mexico.
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housing benefits. However, these explanations can only be accepted as secondary motives for
initiating the housing program, but there is insufficient evidence to prove that they are primary
incentives that pushed GM into the housing commitment. Chapter 5 will delineate how
construction companies and US sources of capital worked together to promote the housing
program in order to secure large government contracts with substantial subsidies. I will analyze
the role of the construction industry in generating the impetus and political backing to push
forward the housing project at a time when the construction industry was nearing economic and
financial collapse. The financial relationship of the construction industry and General Motor's
mortgage financing subsidiary, GMAC-RFC (General Motors Acceptance Corporation-
Residential Funding Corporation) will also be scrutinized. This chapter will also analyze a variety
of political considerations and political connections that helped bring about this public-private
partnership. The importance of outside interests is perhaps the most compelling hypothesis of
why Delphi Automotive decided to introduce their housing program.
The Delphi-INFONAVIT partnership was a complex arrangement with many actors,
including the 6000 families' that eventually received government-subsidized housing. This $100
million housing contract had many other beneficiaries behind the scenes and this is critical to
understanding the fact that this was not just an ordinary social housing program designed to
provide housing to Mexico's urban poor. If housing planners would like to see greater private
sector participation in housing finance and housing provision, then examining the incentives that
promote this type of public-private housing partnership is a good way to analyze the costs and
benefits of this type of arrangement.
1.6 Methodology
Personal interviews were my most important source of data. I spent two weeks in Ciudad
Juirez in January 2002, and spoke with Delphi personnel officers, management, and public
relations officers. I visited the Delphi-INFONAVIT housing complexes and interviewed Delphi
workers that received houses through the project. I have named only those Delphi workers that
were explicitly instructed by the Public Relations office to assist in my research, and have
preserved the anonymity of all other Delphi employees.
7 There is some inconsistency with the exact number of housing credits in the Delphi program. There were
several phases of the project, and not all of the credits that were approved by INFONAVIT were actually
distributed. The total number of credits approved was 7000, but only 6000 were actually disbursed as of 2002.
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I toured a Delphi maquiladora in Ciudad Juirez, called Sistemas Electrdnicosy Conmutadores
(SEC), and interviewed employees and personnel officers. (Serrano interview, January 24, 2002)
I attempted to gain access to another Delphi plant, but was instructed that the only plant that I
was authorized to visit was SEC. I had access to personnel files to obtain figures on housing
costs, housing subsidies, and workers' wages.
I also interviewed professionals in the construction industry in Ciudad Juarez. I
interviewed David Arelle, owner of the construction company that started the housing program,
and also spoke with branch offices of Su Casita, the mortgage company that financed Delphi's
houses. Additionally, I spoke with several public housing agencies including INFONAVIT and
IVI, the Instituto de Vivienda, the state of Chihuahua's housing agency.
Secondary sources of information, including newspaper articles, videos, and journals that
featured the Delphi housing program were useful in comparing the media's different perspectives
on the program. Newspaper articles in business and real estate magazines were also critical in
researching investments made by US companies in the Mexican housing sector. An analysis of
the Mexican housing market since the 1994 financial crisis is also important in understanding the
private sector's activity in social interest housing.
The literature review looks at a broad range of disciplines including corporate social
responsibility (CSR), labor turnover and labor markets, housing markets, social housing and
housing finance in Mexico, Mexican labor movements and the maquiladora, company town
literature, the role of the construction industry in Mexico, the history of unions within General
Motors and Delphi, and the history of INFONAVIT.
-16-
Chapter 2
The Housing Partnership
The anecdote of how the Delphi housing program began has become almost legendary
within General Motors and its subsidiary, Delphi Automotive. Lee Crawford, executive director
of Delphi Mexico at the time the housing program began in 1996, is considered the father of the
program. In the early 1990s, Jack Smith, the Chairman of General Motors, visited its Delphi
subsidiary in Ciudad Judrez. Lee Crawford made a point of driving the visiting CEO to the
shantytowns where many of Delphi's employees live. From that moment on, the story goes,
Delphi and General Motors became committed to improving the living conditions of its Mexican
workers.
Crawford dedicated a considerable amount of time looking for the "right" housing
program, and started by working with a consultant who had been hired by INFONAVIT to
design a project that would fit the needs of border workers. (Crawford interview, January 22,
2002) Many young workers came to the border to work in maquiladoras, but often they could
not qualify for INFONAVIT homes. According to Crawford, often the workers "didn't have
enough points to qualify for government housing." (Crawford interview)
Lee Crawford had been frustrated with INFONAVIT because for years Delphi had been
paying the required 5% employer contribution, but were not seeing a reasonable return in terms
of the number of housing credits for their employees. When asked if he felt that Delphi had
been contributing much more [to INFONAVIT] than they were receiving in return, Crawford
replied, "Oh yes, but this was true with all other companies, not only Delphi." (Crawford
interview) Most critics noted that INFONAVIT's income from employer contributions far
exceeded what it was producing in housing. Several times, the housing agency had been accused
of funneling housing funds towards the PRI's election campaigns. (Natalie Pickering interview,
April 1, 2002; Angel Garcia interview, January 2002)
Crawford recounted other attempts at starting housing projects, including a pilot project
with the Chihuahua state government that had been designed to provide 400 houses. By his own
accounts, the project turned out to be a disaster because of the heavy documentation the
Chihuahua housing agency required. Since many of Delphi's workers came from the interior,
they did not have their birth certificates and other legal documentation that was necessary to
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participate in state programs. Additionally, Crawford cited the heavy administrative burden that
was placed on Delphi's employees. He noted, "Our personnel people were doing all the work.
In terms of loan qualifications.. .it was a major, major effort, in Mexico in particular because
people don't have credit history or the necessary documentation." (Crawford interview, January
22, 2002) Crawford went on to say that Delphi had learned a lot about what NOT to do in a
housing project. A housing project would be more successful in Delphi's eyes if Delphi were not
responsible for auditing the contractor, auditing the construction site, and performing loan
qualifications. This put an undue administrative burden on Delphi, and it was important to find a
partner that could take over some of these administrative responsibilities. Although Delphi was
committed to worker housing, they remained an autopart manufacturer and did not have the
personnel or the expertise to become heavily involved in the loan qualification process.
Other attempts at finding the right housing program included an attempt to form a
partnership with Habitat for Humanity. Several Delphi employees volunteered at Habitat in
Mexico, but ultimately, no formal agreement was made because Habitat would not agree to
earmark housing for Delphi employees. For ideological reasons, Habitat for Humanity only
builds community housing and will not designate recipients based on religion, employment, or
political affiliation. Although Crawford said he understood Habitat's decision and respected their
work, a partnership with Habitat would not produce the Delphi worker housing that the
company was looking for, and certainly not as fast as Delphi wanted it.
Lee Crawford indicated that by 1996, INFONAVIT had designed the Housing Savings
Program, Binomio Ahorro Hogar and Delphi was ready to sign on, but was looking for the right
contractor. Delphi met with several construction companies, until finally, Grupo Condak and
Pulte found him.
Grupo Condak
Accounts from David Arelle, owner of Grupo Condak, indicate that the construction
company played a major role in designing the INFONAVIT program, Binomio Ahorro Hogar.
(Arelle interview, January 21, 2002) INFONAVIT had launched a similar savings program for
the restaurant industry in Mexico City in 1995, but the program never took off because there was
not enough interest on the part of the private sector employers. The basic premise of the original
savings program was that the employees would save 20% of the price of the home for the down
payment and INFONAVIT would award the workers a loan of up to 80% of the price the house.
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This was a departure from previous government housing practice, because a standard
INFONAVIT credit would award the worker loans of up to 100% of the price of the house.
Grupo Condak had been building homes in Ciudad Juirez since 1974, but the economic
crisis associated with the 1994 devaluation of pesos had crushed the construction industry. In
1995, Condak needed a partner to provide capital so that the construction company could
continue building homes. It partnered with Pulte Mortgage Corporation, the largest homebuilder
in the US. Shortly after the two construction companies partnered, they approached
INFONAVIT to suggest that the agency's savings program be expanded for the maquiladora
industry. According to David Arelle, it was Condak-Pulte that founded the idea of Binomio Ahorro
Hogar, the INFONAVIT program that was launched in 1996 with Delphi Automotive. (Arelle
interview, January 21, 2002)
Mr. Arelle adds that Condak's real contribution was in paying attention to the smaller
administrative details that made INFONAVIT's first attempt with the savings program a failure.
(Arelle interview, January 21, 2002) Lee Crawford agrees that it was Condak's attention to detail
that made the program a success. Condak employees would come into the Delphi maquiladoras
and have information sessions with interested workers, explaining the savings program and the
INFONAVIT selection process. The construction company would take an active role in
working with INFONAVIT in the loan qualification process, removing the burden from Delphi's
personnel department. Additionally, Crawford adds, Condak built good houses so neither Delphi
nor INFONAVIT had to audit the constructor's work. This was an administrative task that had
plagued the national housing agency, since working with so many contractors had required
enormous oversight to ensure that workers received quality homes. (Crawford interview, January
22, 2002)
In addition to earmarking housing credits for Delphi and requiring a down payment, another
important divergence from INFONAVIT's traditional method of supplying housing credits was
the fact that a single construction company received all the housing contracts. Normally,
construction companies build houses according to INFONAVIT specifications and then offer
their houses to INFONAVIT to be put on the market for the workers. Workers can then choose
their preferred construction company or their preferred lots, given their budget constraint.
Under the Delphi-INFONAVIT program, Delphi employees had to take Condak houses, but
could choose from several Condak lots. When questioned about the fairness of a government
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program that assigned an exclusive contract with a private company', David Arelle replied
jokingly, "my houses are the best." On a more serious note, he continued, "we were the ones
that invented this product." (Arelle Interview, January 21, 2002) Ultimately, Condak's reward
for their innovation was a $100 million project for 7000 homes that was a pilot program for
Binomio Ahorro Hogar.
2.1 How the program works: financing and employee selection
Employer-assisted housing models vary significantly, and some schemes for lowering
housing costs include matching savings program, offering below market interest rates, subsidized
secondary mortgages, mortgage guarantees, and home buyer education. Jennings, 2000, p.8)
Delphi's housing program can be considered a comprehensive program because it features all of
these characteristics (for different borrowers, different incentives are offered) whether it is
offered directly by Delphi (matched savings), by the construction company (home buyer
education) or by INFONAVIT and FOVI (below market interest rates and mortgage guarantees.)
The housing program had three distinct components, targeting different housing markets
and Delphi employees. The main program that receives the majority of the press attention is the
Hourly Program, the original agreement that was signed in June 1996 between INFONAVIT and
General Motors for its Delphi employees. The Hourly Program is also called the Binomio
Ahorro Hogar under INFONAVIT's classification system. In 1999, Delphi began a smaller
Salag Program for its salaried workers whose earnings exceeded the parameters of INFONAVIT'
financing. The second program used INFONAVIT workers' contributions, but credits were
actually assigned by the Mexican Housing Agency, FOVI. Finally, the Gerente Program'0 was
designed for Delphi's management and supervisors, presumably under the same financing
structure as the Salary Program, but with higher quality homes. Due to the limited amount of
information available on the Gerente Program, and ostensibly because it involved only a small
number of Delphi's management, I will not be discussing the details of the third housing
8 Most government contracts are awarded through a "Convocatoria" or a special bidding process. Although
INFONAVIT does not have a strong record in this area, for a $100-million contract for 7000+ homes to be
awarded without a bid process seems unusual.
9 Throughout its 30-year history, the various administrations have targeted different populations in it patronage. In
1995, INFONAVIT targeted households that earn between 1 - 10 minimum wages, but the bulk of the lending
actually went to those households that earned between 2-3 minimum wages. (Lea & Bernstein, 1995)
10 Gerente is the Spanish term for boss or manager. Several workers referred to the Gerente Program, but no
one would give me a formal interview about the program, nor did I find a manager who would answer my
questions.
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program. However, this section will review the financing and employee selection process of the
Hourly program and the Salary program.
Hourly Program - INFONAVIT financing
INFONAVIT's new housing product", Binomio Ahorro Hogar, differed from previous
housing credits in that it required worker savings toward a down payment. A goal of 20%
savings was set and when a worker signed up for the program, they would agree to a "Savings
goal" or a salary deduction and would save money for a designated amount of time, from 1, 2 or
3 years, depending on how much money they already had in their INFONAVIT sub account.
The employer was providing a 5% contribution toward every worker's INFONAVIT sub-
accounts, so a worker that had been contributing to the fund for several years or who had a good
salary could have already accrued 20% of the price of a house. This scheme is typical of other
Employer-assisted housing programs in the US, which frequently offer forgivable loans to help
with down payments and closing costs. Jennings, 2000, p.8)
" The program was open for other employers as well, and Delphi can in some ways be considered to be the pilot
project.
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To qualify for INFONAVIT housing, workers were required to be first-time
homeowners." Since this meant that most of the potential homebuyers had limited knowledge
of the finance process, Grupo Condak implemented a homebuyer education program. Delphi
allowed construction company's 'promoters' to come into maquilas and conduct meetings with
interested workers to explain the finance process, the costs, and help workers understand the
qualification process."
By the end of the designated saving period, if an employee did not save 20% of the price
of the home, then Delphi Automotive" would provide financial assistance to complete the 20%.
Under the contract, the employee would sign a loan agreement in which s/he was committed to
repaying the loan over a 5-year period. If the employee continued to work with Delphi, they
would receive an annual "bonus" equal to the amount of the required loan repayment. In this
manner, the loan was actually forgiven if the employee remained with the firm. If an employee
left the firm 2 years after receiving the house, they would have received 2 annual bonuses and
would have made 2 payments toward Delphi's loan. However, they would be responsible for the
remaining payments in years 3, 4, and 5, but without their employers' annual bonus.
Tax issues made this loan agreement more complex. According to Mexican law, an
employer is not allowed to give employees tax-free loans. Therefore, the balance of the down
payment was structured as a loan from the construction company, Grupo Condak. This meant
that Delphi would give Condak the down payment assistance, and the employee would sign a
loan agreement with the construction company. Additionally, having the workers owe the
construction company removed a possible moral hazard in which the employees might not take
the loan agreement with their employer seriously. (Guti6rrez interview, January 16, 2002) It also
prevented the appearance that Delphi was controlling its workers' homes.
12 Technically, this restriction is to prevent using government funds to obtain a second house. In practice, the
restriction applies only to using your funds for a second INFONAVIT house, and Mexicans who had purchased a
house independent of INFONAVIT could still try to cash in their government housing credit.
13 The Condak model of sending promoters into maquilas to explain the mortgage/savings process to workers has
precedents. In Rogers, Arkansas, a small town comprised mainly of poultry processing firms, Tyson Foods
began a housing program to address severe shortages of workers in 1994. Tyson's program was a partnership
with First National Bank and Trust company which provided workers with financial literacy education to help
Foultry workers understand the housing finance process. (Housing Facts & Findings, 2000, p. 9)
1 Delphi Automotive's subsidiaries were actually contributing this down payment assistant, but since there are
close to a dozen subsidiaries, I am using the parent company's name to avoid confusion. Subsidiaries include
Packard West, Delphi Electronic, Rio Bravo Electric, Delphi Energy, Delco, SEC, etc.
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The first phase of houses was delivered from 1997-1999 under the program Binomio
Ahorro Hogar. (See Table 1) This program was a Delphi-INFONAVIT partnership targeting
Delphi's hourly employees that mostly work in Delphi's maquiladoras. This category of hourly
employees also includes some entry-level office staff or "auxiliaries."
However, an interview with Maria Teresa'", an office assistant that received a house under
the "hourly" program, indicated that for most white-collar staff, INFONAVIT housing quality
was undesirable. Maria Theresa is a 23-year old office assistant at Delphi Automotive's technical
headquarters. She recounted the story of growing up in a middle class Mexican home in Ciudad
Juirez and how difficult it was to move into INFONAVIT housing complexes.
Although for blue-collar workers who were leaving the colonias, INFONAVIT housing
was an improvement, for office staff, the story was quite different. Maria Teresa had only been
working at Delphi for 1 year, but her income as a finance assistant qualified her for Type IV
housing, the second largest home. In her case, she and her husband spent thousands of pesos
making improvements on the home, including an addition to the house, and adding steel bars to
all the windows and the front door. Maria Teresa indicated that such protection measures were
absolutely necessary in an INFONAVIT neighborhood. She expanded her 600 square foot
house before moving into it, and plans on moving out within the next two years. Like others
who received housing, she will either sell her house or use the rental income as an investment. It
was difficult to collect data on the number of housing recipients who used housing credits as a
source of rental income as opposed to using the units as a primary residence. This practice is
illegal under INFONAVIT rules, but is tolerated. Some amount of flexibility is necessary with
this law, because it is quite natural for a family that needed government housing at one point in
their lives to advance economically and want to move out of these homes once they can afford to
move into a better neighborhood.
The Director of Ciudad JuArez Municipal Planning Office, Dr. Siqueiras, agreed that
INFONAVIT housing had a high level of delinquency and crime in their neighborhoods. High
density and limited green spaces meant that youth had nowhere to go but to hang out in the
streets. The high crime rate is characteristic of INFONAVIT housing complexes in general, and
not just Delphi-INFONAVIT housing. However, the crime rate, the stigma of government
housing, and the limited amenities of INFONAVIT housing made it undesirable for many white
15 Fictional name used to conceal her identity.
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collar workers. In Maria Teresa's situation, they invested substantially in their new home, but
plan on selling the home or renting it out within the next two years. She indicated that most
supervisors who received houses rented the houses or gave them to their adult children instead of
residing in them.
The Salary Program - FOVI financing through SOFOLES
In interviews, both Lee Crawford and Eduardo Serrano, indicated that the salary-housing
program was started in 1999 in response to the overwhelming demand from salary employees
about being excluded from the hourly housing program. This program only provided 800
houses, but it was able to take advantage of a loophole in INFONAVIT laws. The housing
program did help Delphi workers gain access to housing credits, when they would not have been
able to qualify for INFONAVIT housing under normal circumstances. Ironically, Delphi helped
its employees that could not qualify because they made too much money, as opposed to the helping
out those that made too little money.
Just as in the hourly program, the salaried workers did not have a choice of construction
companies, and were required to buy Condak houses. FOVI, Fund for the Operation of Bank
Housing Finance, is a housing agency similar to INFONAVIT, but for higher income workers.
FOVI financing typically works through a SOFOL, a non-depository financing agency working
exclusively with housing finance, in cooperation with the Mexican housing agency. In this case,
the Delphi salary workers were also obligated by contractual arrangements to use Hipotecaria Su
Casita, a subsidiary of Pulte Mortgage Company, the construction company's partner. It is these
contractual arrangements with the construction company and the mortgage lender that make this
program unique from other INFONAVIT and FOVI housing credits. Securing high volumes of
government subsidized contracts also made it an attractive investment for construction
companies and for the foreign capital used to finance Su Casita's mortgages.
Jezabel Ferndndez, an office assistant in the public relations office at Delphi, received a
house under the salary program. When asked about the company's financial assistance with her
house, she replied, "No, the company didn't provide me with down payment assistance or with
any money. What the company [Delphi] did was help negotiate with INFONAVIT to get me the
money that Delphi had been contributing to my INFONAVIT sub-account." (Fernandez
Interview, January 16, 2002) Essentially, Delphi had been paying the required 5% contributions
to Jezabel's INFONAVIT account, and INFONAVIT kept those savings in her housing sub
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account. However, Jezabel's income was too high for INFONAVIT's qualification process.
Although the Juarez INFONAVIT director would later state that there was no clear cut-off point
in terms of wages and qualifications, workers making more than 8 minimum wages had a very
difficult time qualifying for housing credits. In Mexico, income distribution is expressed in
mnimum wages. In 2002, the minimum wage was approximately $4.61 a day, so multiples of this
figure would represent the different income brackets that are used for determining eligibility for
government housing, or for any government statistics.
In Jezabel's case, she made too much money, and her income would probably only
increase with time. Since the INFONAVIT reforms in 1992, her employer's contributions would
not disappear, but they would remain in her accounts until her retirement. At retirement, if she
had never received a housing credit from INFONAVIT, her housing savings would be
transferred into her "AFORES" account, or a retirement account. Although the savings were
not lost, for Jezabel, who appeared to be in her mid-20s, she would have to wait 40 years to
access these savings. With the help of Delphi, she was able to gain immediate access to her
savings and make an investment, as well. However, this was not an INFONAVIT credit. This
was a transfer of funds from INFONAVIT to a FOVI-financed house.
Jezabel and her husband were living with her mother-in-law prior to receiving the house.
Although she is the happy owner of a new house, Delphi's salary program was not what
INFONAVIT had envisioned. One Delphi employee familiar with the Delphi-INFONAVIT
negotiations claimed that INFONAVIT was displeased with this program, but had realized too
late what was happening with the funds. Essentially, INFONAVIT had turned over the savings
of the salary employees without realizing that this money would be turned over to Hipotecaria Su
Casita as a down payment for a FOVI loan. This is money that INFONAVIT would have
preferred be used for INFONAVIT credits, and not to help another government agency. Since
the salary housing was almost twice the cost of INFONAVIT housing, the money used for down
payments could arguably have been used for twice as many INFONAVIT credits.
In terms of leveraging financing for poor households, the Delphi salary-housing program
essentially defeated INFONAVIT's purpose in creating the Binomio Ahorro Hogar. Ostensibly, the
main benefit of the saving program was that it was a way for INFONAVIT to increase the
number of housing credits it awarded annually. If it was no longer financing 100% of the price
of a home, the agency could increase the number of workers that received assistance. The
INFONAVIT director in Ciudad Juarez added, "The idea is not to award 10 houses of 200,000
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pesos a piece, but it is better to award 20 houses at 150,000 pesos." (Garza interview, January 18,
2002) The employer's down payment assistance could fill the gap between the INFONAVIT
credit and the price of the home.
Xochitl Diaz, Delphi Media Relations officer in Ciudad Judrez, explained that the salary
program filled a gap in the housing finance market. Low-income workers could qualify for
INFONAVIT financing, and high-income workers could afford to go to a private bank.
However, in between these layers, there existed a class of young, entry-level office workers that
could not afford private sector mortgages, but whose higher earnings disqualified them from
INFONAVIT loans. (Diaz interview, January 16, 2002)
Table 1: Summary of Delphi's Housing Program
Hourly Program Salary Program
"Binomio Ahorro Hogar"
Years 1997-1999 1999-2001
Beneficiaries Hourly employees, mostly maquila Office workers, supervisors,
workers, and entry level office staff managers
Average income 1.7 - 8 minimum wages 12-13 minimum wages
Housing agency INFONAVIT FOVI
Financing source INFONAVIT Hipotecaria Su Casita
Ave price of houses $17,000-$24,000 $33,000-$52,000
(4 types of houses available) (2 main types of housing)
Interest rate 6% 8.5/
Down Payment 20% 20%
required
Delphi down payment Workers earning <3 minimum wages No Delphi financial
assistance typically received assistance to contribution, but negotiated
complete the required 20% down the use of INFONAVIT
payment. funds
Amount of average $1500-$2000 $0
Down payment (Per worker)
assistance from Delphi
Number of houses 5173 800
Source: Compiled by author with information from Delphi's Personnel ofice, Hipotecaria Su Casita, and Grupo
Condak sales agents
Housing types and quality
In examining the size and quality of housing, two different products are available.
INFONAVIT housing is intended for lower income workers, and the largest homes are typically
60 square meters, or approximately 600 square feet. Some houses are on larger lots, to allow the
worker the opportunity to enlarge the house or add rooms to the house if necessary. The
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number one complaint about INFONAVIT housing is that they are "shoebox" houses that are
small and located in neighborhoods where hundreds of your neighbors have the exact same
house. Although improvements have been made in design to allow for the option of expanding
the house, recipients of Type I housing did not have lot sizes large enough for expansion.
The other interesting factor is that the quantity of Type I houses was capped at 30% by
Grupo Condak. (Delphi personnel department) This meant capping the number of low-income
workers that could qualify for the program. As earlier, the vast majority of the housing was
targeting the upper range of housing. Condak that requested a cap in the smaller houses,
presumably because of the lower profit margin with smaller houses.
Claudia 6, a Delphi personnel officer, indicated that most of the workers who earn less
than 3 minimum wages have to renegotiate the terms of their payment with INFONAVIT. As
already noted, only 30% of Delphi's credits actually went to workers earning less than 3
minimum wages, but of these workers, Claudia estimated that the majority of them could not
afford the 25% salary deduction that INFONAVIT takes for monthly payments. These workers
must then go to INFONAVIT offices and negotiate a longer payment term, which will reduce
their monthly payments. Therefore, despite good intentions to reach lower income workers
through INFONAVIT housing credits, these are precarious mortgages when the workers earn so
little that they can barely make payments.
2.2 Employee selection
In 1992, INFONAVIT went through a dramatic reform and restructured the agency to
improve its services and increase transparency. One reform included the introduction of a points
system, which would qualify workers for housing. The previous system had awarded housing
credits in a raffle, but this system heightened criticism of INFONAVIT for awarding houses for
political benefits. The new qualification systems examined a worker's salary, age, number of
years worked, number of dependents and total contributions to the fund. This employee profile is
then used in a qualification system in which workers are assigned points and must reach a certain
level to be considered for a housing credit. Prior to this, the agency was criticized for its method
of allocation of housing credits.
16 Name concealed
In designing any housing program in which social and economic development is an
implicit goal, the selection of the recipients of housing is a critical factor in determining the
impact of the program. It is for this reason that INFONAVIT had designed their qualification
system to benefit those workers who had low salaries, but who still had steady employment and
were capable of making payments. Under the initial Delphi-INFONAVIT housing program,
(hourly program) workers had to make between 1.7 - 10 minimum wages' 7 to qualify for the
hourly program.
In examining the distribution of housing benefits, it appears that providing housing for
the 'poor' was not a priority in the selection process. The following table shows the salaries of
the Mexican population. By providing subsidized housing benefits to workers that earn more
than 10 minimum wages, the government is subsidizing housing for workers in the top 5% of the
country. The Salary program actually targets workers that made 12-13 minimum wages, (Serrano
interview) which are truly some of the wealthiest wage earners in Mexico, and is well above the
target income of FOVI. As a methodological note, it should be stressed that these statistics are
for individuals, and that for purposes of mortgages, household income is considered, as opposed
to individual income.
17 This figure was disputed. Although all interviewees agreed that 1.7 was the minimum, the Arelle interview
indicated that the range was 1.7-8.0 minimum wages, while the Delphi Personnel staff indicated that the
qualifying range was 1.7-10.0. The initial Delphi press statements indicated that 8 minimum wages was the
maximum, but it is assumed that employee pressure for houses made Delphi raise the qualifying wage.
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Table 2: Percentage of labor with given minimum wages, 2000 Census
Income level Juarez Chihuahua Matamoros Ramos ArizpeSabinas Saltillo National
3.00 1.13% 4.62% 2.84% 3.13% 1.87% 2.14% 8.35%
0.00-0.50 0.65% 1.15% 1.89% 1.26% 1.22% 0.85% 3.52%
.5-0.99 1.75% 2.66% 5.20% 3.20% 3.26% 2.25% 8.79%
1.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00%
1.01-2.00 36.34% 29.31% 43.56% 20.45% 33.87% 19.52% 30.32%
2.01-3.00 19.66% 21.61% 24.45% 28.88% 21.14% 26.84% 17.64%
.00-5.00 17.94% 18.67% 13.03% 21.46% 16.53% 23.25% 14.06%
5.00-10.00 10.64% 10.48% 4.38% 8.51% 10.59% 11.74% 8.01%
10.00+ 5.58% 5.39% 1.15% 5.04% 6.45% 7.47% 3.85%
Undeclared 6.32% 6.11% 3.49% 8.06% 5.06% 5.92% 5.44%
Iotal
population 100.00%100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
% under 2 vsm 39.86% 37.73% 53.49% 28.05% 40.23% 24.78% 51.00%
Juarez Wage Structure, 2000
40.00%
35.00%
* 30.00%
25.00%
o 20.00%
15.00%
0 10.00%
5.000/
0.00%
0.00 0.00-0.50 0.5-0.99 1.00 1.01-2.00 2.01-3.00 3.00-5.00 5.00- 10.00+
10.00
Multiples of Minimum Wages
Source: INEGI 2000 Census. "Censo General de Poblaci6n y Vivienda. 2000" Table 11: Poblaci6n ocupada por
entidad federativa, sexo, y ocupaci6n principal, y su distribuci6n segfin ingreso por trabajo en salario minimo.
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2.3 Sample Maquiladora: SEC, Sistemas Electr6nicos y Conmutadores, Cd. Juirez
For purposes of this study, it is assumed that SEC is a typical Delphi maquiladora in
Ciudad Juirez. However, it is not necessarily representative of the 20 other Delphi subsidiaries in
6 Mexican cities that participated in the housing program. The character of labor, unions, and
wages in different Mexican industrial cities will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
In Ciudad Juarez, SEC is a model plant, frequently used when Delphi gives tours of its
facilities. SEC has received awards for safety and cleanliness including ISO 14000 certification
for environmental standards. Because 60% of the program's houses were allocated to Ciudad
Juarez, the case study of the SEC plant is relevant for developing a framework of Delphi's plants
in Judrez. Delphi has 15 plants in Juirez, which represents approximately 25% of its workforce
in Mexico, so Ciudad Juarez employees received a disproportionate number of housing credits.
The most interesting result of the tour of SEC and of extensive interviews with personnel
officers was the fact that line operators" could not qualify for subsidized housing because they
did not earn enough money. At SEC, 92% of the factory's 3518 workers were hourly workers.
Among hourly workers, a full 79% were line workers, who earned 1 minimum wage 9 when they
entered the factory and who got a raise up to 1.61 the minimum wage after 3 months of work.
($7.43/day) Since the minimum requirement of the housing program is 1.7 minimum wages, the
line workers could not qualify because they did not earn enough money. Until a line worker gets
a promotion, or until the Mexican government changes the minimum wage, it is impossible to get
a raise. When I asked why line workers did not receive houses, Eduardo Serrano, the Director of
Personnel, responded, "Well that's why we call it the hourly program and not the line worker
program." He continued by saying that Delphi may have tried to negotiate with INFONAVIT,
but "not hard enough." (Serrano interview)
Of the remaining 21% of hourly workers that could qualify for homes, most were
technical workers, line leaders, quality control workers, and office staff. Graciela, a Delphi
veteran of 22 years, received a home in 1998. She had started as a line worker, and then moved
her way up to quality control. Although these workers are also deserving of homes, if Delphi's
goal had been to improving the living conditions of its workers, this housing program excluded
the vast majority of its poor workers. In the two weeks that I spent in Ciudad JuArez, Graciela
18 The term operator comes from the Spanish word operador or operadora, which refers to what American
factories would call line workers. The terms operator and line worker will be used interchangeably. Note that
line workers are entry-level workers in factories with no training.
19 According to the exchange rate in January 2002, 9.15 pesos=$1, thus 1 minimum wage=$4.61/day
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was the only worker that I met that received housing that did not work in an office or technical
center and actually worked in an assembly plant.
Table 3: Break Down of SEC's Hourly Workers
Direct Indirect Totals
Classifications: Line workers, Quality control, Auxiliares or M HourlyLevels I, II and line leaders, and Office Workers
"Special" technical staff assistants
1" Shift (6:30-3:30) 1135 271 163 1569
2nd Shift (3:30-Midnight) 943 171 0 1114
3rd Shift (Midnight - 6:30) 483 73 0 556
3rd Shift (Midnight - 6:30) 0 2 0 2
otals 2561 517 163 3241
Percentages 79.02% 15.95% 5.03% 100.00%
Source: Data compiled by author from personnel records provided by Eduardo Serrano,
Delphi SEC, January 24, 2002. (For Table 3 andforpie chart)
Hourly Employees at Delphi's SEC Plant
Ciudad Judrez, Mexico, January 2002
Hourly workers whose wage 5%
qualified for housing program
16%
Summary of
79%
Line workers whose salary was too low to
qualify for Delphi-INFONAVIT housing
program Hourly I
Workers
Director of Personnel,
92%
Prior to meeting with SEC personnel officers and obtaining these statistics, I questioned
Lee Crawford, former Chief Executive of Delphi Automotive Mexico, and asked him why
Delphi had not opted to give its employees a raise, rather than supply housing benefits.
Economists argue that most workers prefer benefits in cash as opposed to benefits in kind.
Crawford replied, " Had we given the employees raises they still wouldn't have been able to get a
-31-
Delphi SEC Plant,
2002
8% Salary Workers
vwmdl --
house." While this is true that a raise would not have allowed Delphi's workers to qualify for a
loan from a commercial bank, if Delphi had raised the wages of line workers, they would have
made the INFONAVIT housing program available to a larger percentage of its employees. In
this case, therefore, it is not accurate to say that giving workers a raise is insufficient to help
workers get their own housing. Precisely the opposite is true. Giving workers a raise was the only
way for workers to qualify for government subsidized housing with INFONAVIT.
Given the characteristics of the unskilled labor market in Juirez, it may not have been
possible to raise the wages of all entry-level line workers. However, a slight pay increase for line
workers that had seniority could have opened the program to many more workers. Eduardo
Serrano indicated that there were some line workers that were "Special Line Workers" who
earned 1.8 minimum wages. He did not have statistics available for this, but estimated that there
were less than 100 line workers at this level, or 3.2% of hourly workers. If Delphi had expanded
this class of line workers, however, the number of people qualifying for Type I housing would
have exceeded Condak's desired amount of the lowest line of housing.
Another interesting part of Delphi's employer-assisted housing program is the level of
government involvement. Without the cooperation of the Mexican government by providing
housing finance and subsidized interest rates, both Grupo Condak and Delphi contend that the
program would not have been possible. (Crawford interview; Arelle interview) How common is
state support of EAH program elsewhere? Stephanie Jennings notes that it is most common for
emplyers to fully finance the administration and financial assistance of EAH. (Jennings, 2000,
emphasis added) However, examples of state aid include the creation of a corporate tax credit
for EAH programs, which was approved by the Connecticut state legislature in 1994. (Jennings,
2000, p. 10) Other options for state aid include establishing a matching fund for EAH, which is
the path taken by the state of Maryland and by cities including Milwaukee and the District of
Columbia. (Jennings, 2000, p.10)
However, none of these state programs have provided the magnitude of support for
Employer-assisted housing that INFONAVIT and FOVI have awarded for Delphi's housing
program. INFONAVIT provided 80% of the financing of the hourly program, which includes
the administrative costs and shouldering the burden of repayment. Similarly, with FOVI, the
housing agency subsidized the private sector lender by paying for origination and servicing fees
and providing below-market interest rates. Interestingly enough, this means that it is the SOFOL
that is actually accruing the benefits of the housing finance. (Bernstein interview; Pickering
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interview) This factor will be examined more carefully in Chapter 5, but in this case, Hipotecaria
Su Casita, a subsidiary of Pulte Mortgage Company, reaped the benefits of FOVI subsidies to
make financing Delphi's salary program a lucrative business.
One researcher of social interest housing in Mexico said, "In all cases, housing is
provided not for the poorest of Mexicans, but for lower-income working Mexicans that earn
incomes between established minimums and maximums." (Yoder, 2001, p.2) Michael Yoder's
insight is also true of the Delphi-INFONAVIT housing program. Lee Crawford's repeated
attempts at improving worker housing through the Chihuahua State housing program and
through Habitat for Humanity are evidence that the Delphi housing program was initiated with
good intentions to improve worker-housing conditions. However, somewhere along the line, this
well-intentioned housing innovation compromised its commitment to low income workers.
Furthermore, neither Delphi nor the construction company wanted to take advantage of
INFONAVIT loans for progressive housing. INFONAVIT has a line of financing that is
designed to award smaller amounts of money ($1000-$2500) for workers that want to make
improvements on their existing lots. The construction companies were not interested in this part
of the market, because frequently, workers used the money to buy materials and did much of the
work themselves to build additions or make improvements. Furthermore, these loans improved
informal housing, but did not create properties that would be part of the formal housing market,
which is what financing companies are interested in. However, by offering smaller loans, Delphi
could have increased the percentage of low-income workers that had access to credit. By making
finished housing units the only option, the poorest workers could never qualify for such a
program.
How do we explain the fact that so many low-income workers were excluded? Does the
maquiladoras low-wage structure have to eliminate so many formal sector workers from
homeownership? Why was the construction company able to cap the number of housing units
for the lowest-income workers? Why did INFONAVIT not regulate the process and allow the
construction company to control the allocation process? Or should we just accept that in
Mexican society not every one has a right to a home, even if they are employed in a very
profitable US business? How do we address the difference between the press releases and the
reality of the housing program? Finally, if the program was not started to give homes to 'poor'
workers, what were GM's motives?
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Chapter 3
Public Relations and Employee Turnover
"This is a great day for General Motors and for Mexico. The agreement we are
signing today will make affordable housing a reality for thousands of our Delphi
employees in Mexico. Without this partnership between government and private
industry, such housing would remain only a dream for many of our Mexican
employees. We have entered this agreement because we believe that social
responsibility and business success go hand in hand. Our record in caring for our
employees and communities as well as the natural environment has become a
model for other companies operating in Mexico to follow."
- GM CEO &President, John Smith, Jr., Canada News Wire, June 18, 1996
This chapter examines what I have termed the "mainstream" hypotheses of motives for
offering employee housing. These conventional views are common interpretations of why a firm
might offer progressive employee benefits such as housing. The first part of the chapter will
examine the importance of generating positive public relations as an incentive for starting the
housing program. The second section of the chapter examines the notion that employer-assisted
housing benefits were offered to reduce employee turnover and associated training costs. I will
show that both of these conventional views are unsatisfactory explanations that are not the
primary incentives that prompted GM to offer its workers housing benefits.
3.1 Public Relations
Increasing criticism of labor practices in Mexico has forced companies like GM and Delphi
to be on the defensive about their business practices south of the border. The introductory
quote is an example of sound bytes that General Motors was able to disseminate in the press,
accompanying the announcement of the housing program. Improving their corporate image and
generating positive public relations was a strategic move by GM. General Motors had
experienced negative press by Ross Perot's anti-NAFTA campaign in the early 1990s. More
important than pleasing consumers and the general public, General Motors' publicity campaign
was aimed at shareholders and US unions. This section will draw on Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) literature to show how GM and Delphi worked to promote an image of
social responsibility in Mexico, and the housing program was a way for the company to show its
commitment to workers and communities around the world.
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In the US press, newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, and the
Christian Science Monitor praised Delphi-GM for their progressive business practices in promoting
housing for Mexico's urban poor. 20 The Mexican press took a slightly different angle and
applauded the cooperation between Mexico's national housing agency and Delphi-GM. Despite
the different approaches, the press was very cooperative in offering free advertising for this
housing partnership. Both INFONAVIT and General Motors gained from the positive press
coverage, and the rewards came in a combination of financial and political benefits.
The vast majority of media coverage on the housing initiative was extremely positive. I
found only two slightly negative articles in the mainstream press, which suggest that General
Motors should offer workers a living wage if it were really concerned about employees' welfare.
The title of the Los Angeles Time article is quite revealing: " Pesos Don't Seem to Trickle Down
in Ciudad Juirez, Mexico: Thanks to US prosperity, this border city is booming, but little of the
wealth finds its way to workers." (Stevenson, 1999) However, in a review of major newspaper
and journal articles on the Delphi housing program from 1996-2002, only two press agents
presented slightly negative interpretations of the Delphi housing program. (Stevenson 1999;
Blumenstein & Solis, 1997)
How much effort did General Motors commit to promoting positive press coverage?
GM President Jack Smith, the president of the largest company in the world, came down to
Ciudad Junrez for the inauguration of the first 20 homes in 1997. Jenalia Moreno of the Houston
Chronicle reported, "The workers showed off their homes to foreign dignitaries and gave tours to
executives such as General Motors' Chairman Smith." (Moreno, 2001) All the local media
carried this story and journalists from the US and Canada were also invited. Although Jack
Smith's presence could be interpreted as his genuine commitment to workers' housing, the
president cooperated with Grupo Condak who would later produce a promotional video
featuring this event, signaling the fact that his flight to Mexico was motivated by more than just
compassion for Mexican workers. By sending VIPs from Detroit down to Mexico, Delphi and
General Motors ensured that the housing program received the media attention that the company
wanted. The fact that Canadian press (see opening quote) was also invited to the ceremonies is
20 Millman, Joel. "Labor: In Mexico, a GM Worker Sprints Into the Middle Class." Wall Street Journal.
07/29/98; Moreno, Jenalia. "More Casas for Workers: US Companies, Builders creating better housing for prices
affordable to maquiladora employees." Wall Street Journal, 03/04/01; Kraul, Chris. "Mortgaging the Future:
Firms Help Employees at Mexico's Border Factories Buy Homes" Los Angeles Times. 12/21/96; LaFranchi,
Howard. "Mexico struggles with shortages on the homefront." Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 2001, p.7.
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also telling. Not only was GM concerned with reaching American labor unions like the United
Auto Workers (UAW), but recent labor disputes with the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) made
Canada a critical audience as well.
In recent years, public awareness of labor rights issues has increased dramatically in the
United States. In Mexico in particular, labor rights activists have exposed firms that repress labor
organizing, practice discriminatory hiring practices," force overtime, and have non-democratic
union representation. Many multinational firms in developing countries have found that they
must cater to two audiences. Back home, their business practices are policed by the ubiquitous
media coverage and by non-governmental organizations and labor organizations concerned with
worker rights. More importantly, stockholders are increasingly demanding responsible business
practices. Within Mexico, Delphi is also under the vigilance of local pressure groups including
local government, local worker organizations, and national agencies that regulate the
maquiladoras.
Additionally, Delphi Automotive is under the added pressure of being a subsidiary of
General Motors, a major US automaker that has had many confrontations with the United Auto
Workers (UAW) unions and the Canadian Autoworkers Union (CAW) in its North American
Operations. By sponsoring a progressive housing program that is in the best interests of
workers, and by capitalizing on the positive press coverage, Delphi could avert criticism from
labor rights activists, and take a positive role with community development and housing
advocates. In the United States, labor unions that typically criticize businesses for abusing third
world workers would have to confront the fact that Delphi had instigated a program that was for
the genuine public good.
Is General Motors susceptible to criticism for its labor practices in Mexico? This is a
difficult question to address because it presupposes that GM executives believe that criticism of
labor abuses will affect car sales in the US. Previous literature that supports this hypothesis
includes stakeholder theory, the dominant paradigm in the Corporate Social Responsibility
literature, which states that customers, employees, suppliers, community groups, government,
and some stockholders can apply pressure on companies for socially responsible business
practices. (Freeman, 1984) Under this hypothesis, Delphi-GM was responding to its
constituent's demands for social responsibility and just labor practices. The housing project
21 Examples of discriminatory hiring practices include asking women if they are pregnant and requiring women
to use contraception in order to avoid paying health benefits that are required under Mexican law.
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would need a lot of positive press coverage so that constituents in Detroit, Washington, DC, and
Mexico City were aware that GM was responding to their demands.
Why do American and Canadian autoworkers care how General Motors treats their
counterparts in Mexico? This is a complicated question, and most evidence22 suggests that there
is little genuine solidarity between workers in the US and Mexico. (Coronado interview, January
14, 2002) However, US workers are concerned about losing jobs to Mexicans, and a key part of
the labor rhetoric to prevent jobs from heading south of the border is to accuse companies of
labor abuses in Mexico. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 in an analysis of
General Motors' US, Canadian, and Mexican labor unions. Whether labor unions pursue this
tactic out of genuine concern for Mexican workers or not, it has become a popular way of
embarrassing companies.
Labor rights activists are also increasingly launching campaigns aimed at embarrassing
corporate America. (Varley, 1998) Targeting familiar stores like Gap, Nike, or Starbucks has
become a popular tactic to raise awareness of labor abuses or exploitation of natural resources.
"These companies have devoted tremendous resources to become household names associated
with particular images or values, and are susceptible to embarrassment in a way that more
obscure companies are not" (Varley, 1998, p. 14) However, Barnet and Cavanaugh add that
attacks on a company's image are more effective "against companies that depend on strong
consumer brand loyalty like Nike and Starbucks, and less well in industries in which there isn't
strong brand awareness.. .or where consumers are companies (auto parts)." (Barnet &
Cavanaugh, 1994) In this case, consumers are less familiar with Delphi Automotive and many do
not realize that it was a subsidiary of General Motors. The notion that American car consumers
would modify their consumption patterns based on Delphi's community practices in Mexico
seems implausible.
Consumer-oriented CSR theory assumes that consumers reward companies that promote
various social issues and that reputation building is a key part of this strategy (Weigelt & Camerer,
1988) But is General Motors concerned about destroying its image for consumers, or is it more
concerned about the effect of negative publicity on labor relations in the United States and
Mexico? Given its long history of labor problems in the United States and costly strikes, (See
2 Irasema Coronado, PhD, University of Texas, El Paso, will be publishing her findings on solidarity between
US and Mexican laborers by the end of 2002.
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Chapter 4) generating a positive image for labor unions is perhaps more important than luring
consumers with a publicity campaign of good conduct.
General Motors' concern for its image and desire to portray the company as a good
corporate citizen is a special bonus of the housing program, but it is unlikely that it was a primary
motive for initiating the program. After the agreement was signed, it is natural for the company's
public relations department to capitalize on the media attention. However, it is implausible that
the public relations department has the necessary muscle to induce GM executives in Detroit to
engage in an $8 million housing program simply to improve the company's public image.
3.2 Turnover
According to maquila plant managers, academics, and the American Chamber of Commerce
in Mexico, "labor turnover is possibly the biggest problem facing US in-bond23 managers."
(Farquharson, 1991) Delphi Mexico is no different than other maquiladoras with rampant
problems with employee retention. Interviews with media representative Xochitl Diaz and with
Delphi-Mexico Executive Director Lee Crawford indicate that reducing turnover was a primary
reason for implementing the housing program. (Diaz interview; Crawford interview)
As one housing analyst notes, "Employers increasingly recognize that long-term retention of
employees depends on availability of quality affordable housing within a reasonable commuting
distance." Jennings, 2000, p.1) Delphi's expectation that turnover would decline with housing
benefits may be a legitimate one, and is documented in both housing literature and labor
economics. However, the actual turnover statistics reveal something different. Although the
company did report a decline in turnover, the statistics can be misleading.
In July 1996, Delphi public relations officer Michael Hissam noted that turnover rates24 had
fallen to 4% per month in Delphi's Mexican plants, compared to the 15% monthly turnover that
the company experienced in the 1980s. (Black, 1996) This is a dramatic reduction in turnover,
23 The terms in-bond, twin plants, maquila, and maquiladora are used interchangeably to refer to export-oriented
industries that are located in Mexico, typically along the US border. These industries are primarily US and
Japanese firms that locate manufacturing facilities in Mexico for export primarily to the US market, but
increasingly to other overseas markets.
24 Delphi Automotive did not supply any disaggregated turnover statistics for the period of 1995-2000. The only
turnover statistics that I have available are from news articles and are reported by the Public Relations Officers.
However, in a tour of Delphi's SEC plant, the Delphi personnel manager, Eduardo Serrano, made note of the fact
that HR managers do keep track of weekly turnover and absentee rates and they are posted in public spaces in
the factories. The turnover rate for the week that I visited the plant was extremely low, but the current statistics
are not useful for this analysis.
-38-
and Mr. Hissam offered evidence from 50 plants and over 63,000 workers in 1996. However,
this reduction in turnover occurred before a single INFONAVIT house was delivered, and only 1
month after the program was announced in all the major media. Since the first homes were not
delivered until mid 1997, and in particular, since Hissam refers to a decline since the 1980s, this
dramatic decline in turnover cannot be attributed to the housing program. Only a decline from
the 4% monthly turnover that was cited in July 1996 (at the inception of the program) could
potentially have been caused by the incentive of housing benefits. The reported fall in employee
turnover occurs before the housing program was initiated and leads us to alternative explanations
for falling turnover rates.
A review of the literature on employee turnover and retention cites numerous potential
explanations for high turnover. Employee profiles on characteristics such as age, sex, marital
status, and employment history have been painstakingly examined in numerous studies to
determine which employees experience higher turnover rates. Many of these variables are
beyond the scope of this thesis, but a few of the relevant theories on labor turnover will be
examined in this section.
Leticia Pefia Villasefior wrote a comprehensive analysis2 s of employee turnover in Mexico's
maquiladoras in the state of Chihuahua, Mexico, which is particularly useful for this thesis. (Pefia
Villasefior, 1994) Two cities in the state of Chihuahua received a disproportionate amount of
Delphi's housing benefits. Sixty-one percent of Delphi's housing program went to workers in
Ciudad Juarez and an additional 12% went to the city of Chihuahua. Pefia's analysis of turnover
in Chihuahua in the 1990s is therefore relevant to Delphi's turnover situation in a comparable
period.
Explanations for labor turnover can be divided into work and non-work factors. (Pefia
1994) Work factors can include issues such as worker satisfaction, wages and compensation, and
interaction of management with labor. Non-work factors are external characteristics that affect
labor's behavior. The dominant external factors in this case are general fluctuations in the labor
market in northern Mexico, and the shifts in the Mexican economy and the US economy.
Compensation is a key work factor in employee retention, and opinion polls show that
pay and benefits are the two most important factors for workers in every job classification.
(Shiemann, 1984) A key characteristic of high skilled labor is the expectation for higher pay.
25 Pefia examined 6 maquiladoras in Chihuahua from 1988-1994, including the automobile industry. The
maquiladoras provided actual statistics and evidence from exit interviews. (Pefia Villasefnor, 1994)
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Confidential interviews with office personnel and management at Delphi Technical Center"
unanimously revealed that Delphi's workforce was the lowest paid in the industry and in Ciudad
Jusrez, regardless of the skill level. For many professionals, Delphi was a place to get started, but
not a desirable place to end up for a career because of the low pay. Since Delphi is the largest
employer in Mexico, there were lots of opportunities for entry-level professionals, but most used
the company as a stepping-stone to better positions. The introduction of the housing program in
1996 and also of an employee pension plan for salary workers is evidence that Delphi was
concerned about losing its skilled workers, but chose to improve benefits rather than to increase
direct compensation.
In examining non-work factors, external factors such as the effects of the US economy
on the maquiladora industry have been well documented. (Soden, 1999; Carrillo, 1994) The
maquiladora industry is characterized as an export-led industry whose major trading partner is the
US, although increasingly, operations in Mexico are exporting to Europe and Asia. Throughout
the 1990s, the US economy was in an expansion period which was consistent with the expansion
in investment in Mexico's maquila industry during the same time period. Similarly, the 1994
devaluation of the Mexican peso made investment in Mexico even more profitable for foreign
investors whose foreign currency would go much further in Mexico. Note that investment in the
maquiladora industry was therefore inversely related to the state of the Mexican economy and
positively related to the US economy. The downturn in the Mexican economy associated with
the devaluation of the peso in 1994 caused an upturn in the maquiladora industry, which also
coincided with a boom of the US economy. These factors pointed to an increase in maquiladora
jobs along the US-Mexico border in the early 1990s, which would be accompanied by an increase
in turnover since jobs were increasing in most maquiladora labor markets.
The current decline in turnover" can be attributed to the deterioration of the economy in
the US and the subsequent slow down of the auto industry in Mexico according to Eduardo
Serrano, Personnel Director at SEC. (Serrano interview) Although Delphi's SEC plant has not
laid anyone off, they are not hiring workers or replacing workers that have voluntarily left the
company. When alternative employment possibilities are abundant, turnover is high, and when
26 Delphi's Technical Center in Juirez is not a factory and does not manufacture auto parts. The Technical
Center is where technicians and engineers conduct research and where functions such as finance and human
resources are performed. Interviews at the Technical Center are therefore reflective of Delphi's high skilled
workers.
27 Evidence on the current turnover in 2002 is to show the factors that influence turnover in general, but today's
turnover rate does not affect the housing program.
there are few job opportunities, workers are less likely to leave their current employer. The
economy's impact on the labor market and employee turnover should therefore be considered a primay reason for
fluctuations in maquiladora turnover.
Characteristics of workers and their relationship to turnover rates are other important
factors to consider. The literature on demographic and socioeconomic factors that affect
turnover is vast. However, for this analysis, the more important factor is determining which
positions within the company experience the highest turnover. Paul Osterman's human capital
model concludes that workers with minimal levels of human capital are most likely to have high
turnover. (Osterman, 1987) These workers have lower productivity and lower wages. More
experienced and more skilled workers would be more likely to stay because they have more
stability and better wages. (Pefia-Villasefior, 1994)
Leticia Pefia's statistical compilation of turnover rates is revealing. (Pefia-Villasefior 1994)
According to Pefia's work, maquiladora technicians and upper level management, including
design engineers, have briefer median employment duration than operators. Her study found
that operators have a median duration of 9.7 months. Supervisors, support staff, and mid-level
administrators, and human resource personnel had an average duration of 24 months. (Pefia-
Villasefior, 1994) This evidence is contrary to the human capital since higher skilled workers
have briefer stays than unskilled workers in Pefia's sample.
There are conflicting theories about whether high skilled or low skilled workers should
experience higher turnover, and the actual statistics are not available. However, the sheer volume
of line workers as a percentage of the total maquila hourly workforce (79% in Delphi's SEC
plant) suggests that an incentive program aimed at line workers would appear to be the best
approach. As discussed in Chapter 2, line workers did not earn enough money to qualify for
homes. Therefore, the program excluded the workers that theoretically should have the greatest
turnover.
When questioned about the effect of the housing program on turnover, Delphi finance
officer, Guillermo Gutierrez, noted that turnover for employees that received housing benefits
was "not high, but higher than we expected." (Guti6rrez interview, January 16, 2002) Mr.
Guti6rrez has been actively involved in formulating the financial arrangements between Delphi,
INFONAVIT and Grupo Condak, and his responses seemed to indicate that turnover was
indeed something that company considered when creating the program.
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I received a more detailed account of turnover statistics from a Delphi personnel officer who
said that 800 out of the 5173 workers that received houses2" had left the company. This
represents 15.5% of the beneficiaries of the housing program. However, because turnover
statistics are typically cited as monthly statistics and because the program has been in effect for 5
years, the corresponding monthly turnover would be a fraction of 1% per month.
The fact that Delphi's housing program did not give housing credits to line-workers
(those most likely to experience high turnover according to the human capital model) can be
interpreted in three ways: (note that these interpretations are not mutually exclusive)
1. Delphi initially created the program for line workers, but pressure from the construction
company and/or INFONAVIT would not permit Delphi to award homes to low income
workers. This interpretation assumes that Delphi's turnover problems were highest with
the operators, consistent with the human capital model.
2. Delphi's turnover problem is more severe among skilled labor including office staff,
technicians, supervisors, and line leaders.
3. Delphi has labor turnover problems with both skilled and unskilled workers, but is more
concerned with employee retention of skilled workers.
One interpretation is that Delphi wanted to reduce turnover among skilled employees,
but were less concerned about turnover amongst unskilled workers. By setting the requirement
that all workers had to be at Delphi for at least one year, the housing benefit was offered to those
employees who were statistically less likely to leave the company. One might argue that entry-
level line workers might want to stay with Delphi for the year in order to be able to qualify.
However, the line workers would only be fulfilling the veteran requirement of minimum of one
years service, but they would not be able to qualify based on pay. Line workers in Ciudad JuArez
would not have 1.7 minimum wages unless they had been promoted to a new position.
My interpretation is that the original housing program was intended for line workers, but
that somewhere along the line, compromises were made with INFONAVIT and the construction
companies. INFONAVIT may have wanted to limit the number of the lowest-income workers
for credit-risk reasons. To maximize their profits, the construction companies wanted to have
higher profit homes which meant higher income workers. Delphi Personnel officers indicated
that an agreement was made with Condak to cap the number of Type I houses (the most
28 Statistics on the exact number of houses varied, but the assumption here is that 5173 workers had received
houses as of January 2002, but it is expected that close to 6000 workers will receive houses once the program is
completed in 2003. The original number of housing credits that INFONAVIT awarded to Delphi was 7000.
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economical houses) at 3 0%. It is also possible that when compromises were made, the top level
Delphi executives signing the agreements probably had no idea that setting a qualifying wage for
the housing program would disqualify such a large volume of its workers. Other than the human
resources directors (and maybe plant managers) it seems unlikely that top level executives would
be familiar enough with maquila workers' wages and the complex Mexican wage structure
(quoted in multiples of minimum wages) such as to realize that they had signed an agreement that
excluded 79% of factory workers at a typical maquila.
Although it might seem plausible that the 1 year minimum requirement was meant to lure
workers to stay with the company and thus lower turnover, it is important to remember that
workers needed to fulfill other criteria to receive housing, and arguably, they could wait to qualify
for a regular INFONAVIT house at any other maquiladora. The Delphi program did expedite
the process, but mostly for higher-wage workers. Since the regular INFONAVIT program
targeted lower income workers, the Delphi housing program would only have been effective in
reducing turnover for line workers under the following conditions:
The housing program could have been more effective at reducing turnover for salary
workers if they received matching contributions from their employers. Under the current system,
most salary workers had enough savings in their INFONAVIT accounts to make the down
payment requirement. After they received the housing credit, they were not indebted to the
company to repay the down payment. Additionally, since the mortgage was serviced and
originated by a private sector bank (that used FOVI financing and received fees from FOVI)
there was no incentive for even skilled workers to stay with the company. The only factor that
might affect salary workers' turnover was the intangible effect of increased loyalty for the
company. Previous research has shown that firms that satisfy employee demand for socially
responsible behavior have higher levels of worker loyalty, morale, and productivity. (Parket &
Eibert, 1975)
The fact that the housing program did not affect turnover does not mean that it was not
an incentive for the program. Reducing turnover was one consideration for introducing the
program, and it was a practical way to justify the initial capital outlay. Lee Crawford would later
state that he believed that the company had gotten its money's worth and had recuperated its
investment by reducing turnover. (Crawford interview) The executive directors' expectations that
the program would reduce turnover can be accepted as an incentive for initiating the program.
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However, there are conflicting theories as to which employees the company hoped to retain,
based on the allocation of the housing benefits.
Evidence that the company had initiated other employee benefits such as a retirement
plan, also indicates that the company was very concerned about losing its skilled workers, but it is
interesting to note that they chose to offer benefits instead of salary increases. One possible
explanation for this is that the housing program was a way to offer employees a service without
having to absorb the full cost of the benefit. With a salary increase, Delphi would have been
responsible for 100 % of the cost of the wage increase. However, with subsidized housing
benefits, Delphi was really facilitating access to credit. Although lower-wage workers did receive
financing assistance for down payments, the majority of workers did not receive money from
Delphi.
As we have seen, the program was not as successful at reducing turnover as the company
would have liked. The dramatic reduction of turnover that is cited in the media actually occurred
before the program was implemented. Current reductions in turnover are attributed to the US
recession, and cannot be linked to housing benefits. Additionally, the program was not
successful at reaching the lowest income workers, which arguably had the greatest turnover
problems and cost the company the most money in training costs.
Although concern with employee retention and with improving public relations may have
been considerations for implementing the program, I contend that neither of these were the
primary motives for initiating Delphi's housing program. The next two chapters will discuss
alternative hypotheses that shed some light on the influence of labor unions, construction
companies, and INFONAVIT on General Motors' decision to implement the housing program.
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Chapter 4
Labor and Unionization
"The UAW may have introduced the sit-down strike to America, but in its
relationship with GM management it has also helped introduce...mutually
beneficial cooperation.. .What comes to my mind is the progress we have made,
by working together, in such directions as providing greater safety and health
protection, in decreasing alcoholism and drug addiction, in improving the quality
of work life."
-Thomas Murphy, former Chairman of General Motors, February 1977 (Freeman &
Medoff 1983, p. 4)
This chapter will examine the hypothesis that General Motors initiated its employee-
housing program in order to control labor or to discourage labor unionization in its plants in
Mexico. Contrary to the company's altruistic rhetoric (i.e. the desire to be a "good corporate
citizen") and to its stated desire to reduce training costs associated with high turnover, this
section analyses two potentially malicious motives for offering employee housing benefits. The
purpose of this analysis is not to attack the character of General Motors' Mexican operations, but
rather to address common criticisms of maquiladoras and to determine if these criticisms can be
applied to the Delphi housing program. The common leftist perspective of Mexican labor
unions is to summarily dismiss all unions as corrupt and regressive. Similarly, attacks on
multinational corporations accuse them of exploitation of labor and of repression of labor
movements. These attacks are not without basis, but can these characterizations be applied to
General Motors and were ulterior motives to control labor a motive for starting an employer-
assisted housing program?
An added twist to the labor hypothesis is the notion that GM may have offered housing
benefits in Mexico in order to offset propaganda by US and Canadian unions. Furthermore, I
will examine the notion that by offering benefits to Mexican workers, GM was really sending a
message to the rest of its North American labor force to discourage them from future strikes. By
investing in workers' housing, GM was showing that it is committed to its investments in Mexico
and had no intention of stopping its plant relocations.
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4.1 Methodological Note
The nature of labor relations in Mexico make this theory extremely complex to examine,
particularly given the frequent characterization of Mexican labor unions as corporatist29 and
corrupt organizations that were used by the Mexican state and the PRI as a means of control of
labor. Most Mexican unions behave in a manner that is opposite to what Americans typically
imagine when they hear the term "unions." Some US labor organizers even argue that the
regressive nature of Mexican unions make some US companies welcome the official unions because
they are a method of control of labor. (Feigen interview, March 13, 2002)
Additionally, there is a dearth of solid empirical evidence on Mexican labor unions. Due
to the delicate nature of the investigation, many companies have historically been uncooperative
with labor investigations by limiting access to employees. On a methodological note, my field
research was limited to Ciudad Junrez, the only city in Mexico in which Delphi plants are non-
union facilities.30 A more comprehensive investigation of this theory would have required visiting
Delphi's unionized plants in Reynosa, Matamoros, Monterrey and Saltillo and meeting with
workers and labor leaders in regions with stronger union representation. Additionally, an analysis
of General Motors' older facilities in the interior of Mexico would have added tremendously to
this analysis.
Due to lack of resources and time, a comprehensive analysis of Delphi-GM's labor
relations was not possible for this investigation. Most of the information on unions is therefore
from secondary sources, interviews with US labor organizations and watchdog groups, and from
telephone interviews with Mexican labor researchers. Much of the information on unions is
anecdotal evidence, and frequently, data from the Mexican government reveals information that
does not paint a complete picture of labor politics in Mexico. One example of information gaps
is data collection on strikes by INEGI, Mexico's national statistical bureau. Since the Mexican
government must approve formal labor strikes, wildcat strikes, in which workers rebel against
their own [undemocratic] unions, are rarely documented in government statistics. (Roxborough,
1984) Despite the difficulty in data collection and the limited amount of academic investigations
29 Corporatist state institutions can be defined as those managed by labor, business, and state representatives.
(Murillo, 1996)
30 In an interview with Lee Crawford, former Executive Director of Delphi Mexico, he indicated that Delphi has
unions in all of its plants in Mexico, except for those in Ciudad Judrez. When pressed about why Juirez was
unique, Crawford indicated that it was "the Mexicans that thought that allowing unions would deter companies
from relocating to Mexico - Delphi doesn't have a problem with unions."
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on Delphi's labor unions, this chapter will attempt to shed some light on Delphi's labor practices
in Mexico, and ultimately examine the importance of labor relations in the decision to offer
housing benefits.
4.2 Mexican Labor Unions
Industrial relations expert Jorge Carrillo notes that analyses of Mexico's maquila industry
are "sharply divided along ideological lines." (Carrillo, 1991) This refers to general perceptions
of whether or not maquilas offer Mexico a genuine path to economic development, but can also
be extended to analyses of labor relations within Mexico. This section will provide two broad
frameworks for analyzing unions in Mexico and then briefly note some historical events that are
credited with further weakening unions in Mexico. One of the frameworks will show the
dichotomy between official unions and independent unions and the second one distinguishes
between maquiladora unions and unions in older industrial centers. Finally, I examine some
geographic differences of unionization along the US-Mexico border which can be used to analyze
GM/Delphi plants.
Social scientists have widely accepted the notion that Mexican "trade unions are passive
instruments of an authoritarian state." (Roxborough, 1984) This standard view of Mexican labor
relations" viewed trade unions as instruments of political stability used to repress and co-opt the
rank file. Roxborough disagrees with this over simplified view of Mexican labor and the political
system. Ian Roxborough's book, "Unions and Politics in Mexico: The Case of the Automobile
Industry" examines the rise of independent unions and their potential threat to the official unions
and the overall threat political stability in Mexico. "Official" unions are those unions that have
historically been associated with the PRI, Mexico's dominant political party that ruled Mexico for
70 years. These official unions are also frequently called 'sindicatos charros,' a pejorative Spanish
term that reinforces the notion that official unions are a means for the PRI to control and co-opt
labor. Corrupt union leaders in Mexico continue to be popularly known as charros. (Hathaway,
1998)
The distinction between official unions and independent unions is an important tool for
analyzing Mexico's labor relations. Independent unions represent a movement to organize labor
31 This view dominated social scientist discussions in the 1980s before NAFTA but persists among many
academics and labor rights activists. Arguably, labor relations have changed in the 1990s in the post-NAFTA
world.
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through unions that are not associated with the PRI or with other political parties. Leftist labor
movements in the United States, including the AFL-CIO, back the independent labor movement
in Mexico, believing that independent unions are the path to democratic union representation in
Mexico. The bulk of Mexico's labor unions, however, remain in the hands of the official unions.
There are 932 unions which belong to 30 official trade federations, and only 179 classify
themselves as independent. (Steiert, 2001) Union membership in Mexico fell 30% over the past
decade from 28.8% to 22.8% which puts Mexico in between its NAFTA counterparts. Canada
has a 37% unionization rate, and the US has the lowest unionization rate3 ' at 12 .4 %. (Steiert,
2001)
However, a long history of corrupt labor unions has left Mexican workers suspicious of
all unions. For many workers, a union's only purpose is to deduct union fees out of workers'
paychecks. Victor Muiioz, a former union leader in the US who worked for several years with
unions on the US-Mexico border, noted that companies feared organizing of independent
unions. A common method to prevent independent unions from gaining a foothold in their
companies was to invite the official unions in to their plants and give them free access to
employees. (Mufioz interview) Companies generally had a high level of cooperation with official
unions, whereas independent unions represented uncertainty for companies. References to
"repression of labor organizing" can refer to tactics such as this one.
In addition to the distinction between independent and official unions, another common
generalization about Mexico's industrial character is often used to distinguish Mexico's labor
movement. Mexico's traditional industrial centers in Puebla, Toluca, (the area surrounding
Mexico City) Monterrey, and Saltillo, should be distinguished from the Mexico's new industrial
activities along the US-Mexico border. Industries developed during Mexico's import substitution
stage from the 1940-1970s had different labor-state relations than the export promotion stage.
(Middlebrook, 1995)
Mexico's shift from import substitution to export promotion and the concomitant
growth in the maquila industry provided one historical event that dramatically changed the face
of labor organizing in Mexico. Another important event that further eroded labor's power was
the economic crisis of the 1980s. The crisis resulted in the De la Madrid administration's
32 The low overall unionization levels in the US can be misleading for this analysis because certain industries,
such as automobile manufacturing, have extremely high unionization rates in the United States.
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controls on wage increases from 1982-1988, (Middlebrook, 1995) which might be characterized
as a turning point in the power of organized unions. The weakening economy made Mexico's
rulers more concerned with macroeconomic stability and national interest, and less concerned
with the needs of the working-class. This same economic crisis forced Mexico into a new stage
of rapid industrialization that was accompanied with an explosion of the maquiladora industry in
the 1980s.
President Salinas began a general crackdown on organized labor when he took office in
1988. (Bryce, 1993) Salinas imposed austerity measures in the name of neoliberal economics and
macroeconomic stability, and repressed worker wages. Salinas is also responsible for putting
Mexico's most militant labor leader in jail. In 1992, Agapito" Gonzalez, the leader of 35,000
workers in Matamoros' 95 maquiladoras, was put in jail because Agapito sought to negotiate a
20% increase in wages. (Bryce, 1993)
Also during the Salinas presidency, NAFTA was passed, which is another factor that will
continue to erode Mexican wages and the power of labor unions. (Shaiken, 1993) Harley
Shaiken notes that in Mexico's controlled labor markets, the "government holds down wages to
attract investment, labor rights are truncated and employers often conspire to set wages."
(Shaiken, 1993) Although proponents of NAFTA argued that increased demand for industrial
workers would raise wages, Shaiken points out that wages are artificially depressed in Mexico,
with wages held down, despite gains in productivity.
The weakening of labor unions has left a void in the state housing agency, which was now
dominated by negotiations between the private sector and INFONAVIT. As we will see,
General Motors negotiated the housing program with INFONAVIT without any input from
organized labor, and without consultation of its workers.
The distinction between maquiladora towns and traditional industrial centers is an
important one in analyzing Delphi and General Motors activities in Mexico. The maquiladora
industry typically deserves its own unique analysis of labor and cannot easily be compared to the
traditional industrial towns. General Motors' installations in Mexico began in 1935 in the
traditional industrial areas in the south-central part of the country, near Mexico City. By 1937,
3 Known simply as "Agapito" in Mexico, this legendary union leader is considered Mexico's most militant
union leader. His union, the SJOIM, is a local branch of the CTM, which is one of the PRI's official unions.
Despite his affiliation with one of the most corrupt unions, Agapito is applauded by the left for pursuing
progressive worker rights, associated with traditional unions.
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GM workers formed unions, which Roxborough characterizes as "relatively militant."
(Roxborough, 1984, p. 80) GM workers in Mexico City went on strike in 1965, 1973, and two
lengthy strikes in 1975 and 1977. The 1975 strike grew from fears that GM would transfer its
plant activities to Toluca, and resulted in a 13% pay increase. (Roxborough, 1984, p. 81) More
strikes occurred in 1979 and 1980, primarily because existing union leaders were struggling to
control new plants opening in Ramos Arizpe, Coahuila in the northern part of Mexico.
(Roxborough, 1984, p. 81) In general, it can be surmised that GM's Mexico City plants had
militant unions that were not afraid to challenge management during the 1980s. Other scholars
note that "only the General Motors union in the Federal District enjoyed both a democratic
tradition dating from the 19940 and considerable organizational autonomy." (Middlebrook,
1995) Another potential conclusion is that General Motors' strategic movement of plants to the
northern part of Mexico was designed to escape from its militant unions in Mexico City.
While it is generally accepted that traditional industrial towns in the south had stronger
unions, a closer analysis of unions in maquiladora towns shows that labor organizing varies
dramatically between cities, and vague generalizations are meaningless when examining local
unions. (Rothstein interview) On one side of the spectrum, Matamoros is frequently
characterized as a city with militant unions, while at the other side of the spectrum is Ciudad
Juirez, a city often viewed as the weakest industrial city in terms of organized unions. However,
this analysis ignores fluctuations in labor leaders' power and presents a static view of a city's labor
movement. Mexico's most militant labor leader, Agapito34 Gonzalez, is credited for negotiating
the highest wages in Mexico. His representation of workers in Matamoros gave union members
wages that were 3 to 5 times the wages paid in Ciudad Juirez in the 1980s. However, the Salinas
administration threw Agapito in jail and Matamoros workers no longer enjoy the dramatic wage
differentials present in the 1980s.
How can these broad generalizations about Mexican labor relations be applied to General
Motors and Delphi Automotive? For starters, there are several studies of General Motors labor
relations which have been briefly mentioned. (Middlebrook, 1995; Shaiken, 1994; Roxborough,
1984) These authors paint a picture of the automotive giant in which labor unions started out
from a position of relative strength, but this power declined dramatically in the 1980s with the
34 According to the US labor movement, Agapito is the only labor leader in Mexico to negotiate collective
bargaining contracts that reflect the genuine interests of his members. (Feigen interview, March 13, 2002)
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economic crisis during the administrations De la Madrid and Salinas. Instances of strikes and
democratic union practices resulted in steady wage increases in GM's plants surrounding Mexico
City from 1940-1970. However, Jorge Carrillo describes a broad restructuring of the auto plant
industry which is characterized by a movement toward the north to secure lower wages, increase
workplace flexibility, and find more compliant unions than those in the historical heart of auto
production in central Mexico. (Carrillo, 1989) Similarly, in a thinly disguised description of
GM35 , which Harley Shaiken calls "Universal," interviews with plant managers reveal that they
were "searching for workers with few preconceptions about industrial organization and for either
no unions or compliant unions." (Shaiken, 1994, p. 43) By 1990, 80.5% of GM workers
(including Delphi Automotive workers) were employed in maquiladoras. (Quintero, 2001, p. 7)
Delphi Automotive does not have the same history of representative unions, and can be
unambiguously defined as purely a maquiladora industry. Delphi's plants are all located in the
northern part of Mexico in maquiladora towns. It should be noted that maquiladora wages are
the lowest among Mexican manufacturing industries, despite the success of the maquiladora
sector. (Quintero, 2001) Analyses of Delphi's labor relations and more generally, labor relations
within maquiladoras are much less prominent in the literature, but there has been increased
attention in recent years. (Quintero, 1997; Carrillo, 1994; Sanchez Diaz, 2000) It is generally true
that if a maquila plant has a union, then the plant will be 100% union because membership is
compulsory36. (Rothstein interview.)
Additionally, Cirila Quintero distinguishes two types of maquiladora unions. Traditional
unions are concerned with making improvements in the working conditions of their members,
and subordinated unions are concerned with management priorities. Traditional unions are
commonly found in the northeast (Matamoros, Tamaulipas) while subordinated unions
predominate the northwestern part of Mexico: Tijuana, Ciudad Juirez, and Nogales. (Quintero,
1997)
35 Shaiken's 1994 article describes a fictional auto plant called "Universal" and features anonymous interviews
with management. However, Shaiken makes reference to "Universal's" plants called Azul and Verde, which are
genuine GM plants.
36 Note that compulsory union membership is outlawed in US labor law, and is a characteristic of Mexico's labor
law that is frequently criticized because of the extraordinary control it gives union leaders that can fire dissident
workers that rebel against the union.
Table 4: Distribution of Delphi's housing by City
Cii 19 1 ',
Judrez 1730 651 351 263 150 3145 60.8%
Chihuahua 252316 2 29 9 608 11.8%
Nuevo Laredo 11 56 72 36 29 204 3.9%
Reynosa 9 91 213 23 0 336 6.5%
Matamoros 23 145 340 0 32 540 10.4%
Monterrey 17 130 111 0 20 278 5.4%
Saltillo 0 59 0 0 3 62 1.2%
Total 2042 1448 1089 351 243 5173
39.5% 28.0% 21.1%1 6.8% 4.7%
Source: Delphi Finance Department
One of the hypotheses that I wanted to examine was to see if the allocation of housing
benefits was actually inversely related to unionization. That is to say, the lower the unionization
presence, the more housing credits the plants received. If this were the case, then one might
hypothesize that Delphi was "rewarding" those workers that did not belong to unions, and that
unionization did not increase workers' benefits. A cursory examination of the housing credits per
city does seem to show that cities with low unionization levels such as Juarez and Chihuahua,
received the bulk of the housing credits with 72.5% of the houses going to these two cities.
Additionally, Saltillo and Monterrey, two older industrial cities, that are not are on the US border
and are not technically "maquiladora" cities, received an extremely small percentage of houses.
Similarly with Matamoros, a relatively small number of houses went to the maquila city that is
reputed to have had the most militant labor leader in Mexico.
This evidence is insufficient to prove that the company was biased in housing allocation
based on unionization, however. There are alternative explanations about Judrez's
disproportionate amount of houses. One explanation is that the housing scarcity in Ciudad
Juirez is worse than the housing deficit in other border cities, so it would be logical to allocate
more houses in areas with the greatest shortages. A 1997 study on Affordable Housing on the
Mexico-US Border showed that Ciudad Justez had the largest housing deficit of 70,000 units,
followed by Tijuana with 60,000, Mexicali with 40,000 and Matamoros with 30,000 housing units.
("Affordable Housing on the Border," 2000)
A second explanation is that Grupo Condak, the construction company, is very active in
this market and had been building in Juirez for over 20 years. It is natural that the construction
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company would be more prepared to expand construction services in Juirez and would have a
network of builders established in this city.
A third hypothesis is that Ciudad Juirez is one of the cities in which Delphi had a
disproportionate amount of skilled workers, and as we have seen, it was skilled workers such as
technicians, engineers, and office staff that actually received housing. In early 2002, the Ciudad
JuArez Technical Center was expanding its Finance division, because an Ohio office was closed
down. Not only did Delphi move to Mexico for cheaper manual labor, but office assistants and
young college graduates in Mexico were cheaper than their counterparts in the US and filled jobs
in human resources and finance.
The following table shows some 1995 estimates of unionization levels in 8 border cities in
Mexico. Note the low rates of unionization in Tijuana (30%) and Ciudad Judrez(130/), the two
largest maquila towns in Mexico.
City Unionization level
Piedras Negras 100%
Nuevo Laredo 100%
Reynosa 100%
Matamoros 100%
Tijuana 30%
Nogales 19%
Ciudad Acuna 16%
Ciudad Juarez 13%
Source: Carrillo, Jorge. "Maquiladoras en Mexico: Evoluci6n Industrial y Retraso Sindical." 2001.
In Ciudad Juirez, the automotive sector does not have unions. "GM, Ford, and Chrysler
are the biggest auto firms, and although these MNC's have unions in almost every plant in the
world, (including in Mexico) they do not have unions in plants in Ciudad Juirez." (Carrillo, 1994,
p.133) Carrillo says this is not because auto plants relocate to regions with low unionization, but
because it "reflects how weak the local unions are, and in particular after 1980 when the plants
arrived." (Carrillo, 1994, p. 133)
A further clarification of Delphi's operations in Ciudad Juirez should also be made,
particularly since a full 25% of Delphi's workforce in Mexico is in Junrez. Rebecca Blumenstein,
a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, noted that Delphi plants in Mexico are mostly union
facilities, but notes that:
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"In Juarez, wages are a pittance by US standards, but GM does provide onsite
education and volleyball courts, organizes Mother's Day parties and sponsors a
Mexican folk-dance troupes.. .and two meals a day are provided at no charge. In
return, management has been able to run the plants almost exactly as it wishes,
with virtually no work rules."
(Blumenstein & Stern, 1996)
Also interesting is the fact that in 1996, Delphi had 189 manufacturing facilities in 37
countries, but the housing benefit was only offered in Mexico, and only for Delphi employees.
Its parent, General Motors, did not extend the housing benefits to its employees in Mexico.
According to its company web site, GM employees 64,000 workers in 54 facilities in Mexico, but
this substantial workforce was excluded from the housing benefits that General Motors
negotiated for its Delphi employees. One of the intriguing parts of the program was the fact that
General Motors negotiated with INFONAVIT to provide housing credits for its subsidiary, but
not for its own direct employees.
Clearly, the construction companies would have liked to service the full market in order
to increase the number of housing credits, expand into more cities, and ultimately increase
profits. When I asked Mr. Arelle why GM employees were not included in the program, he
responded, "Because the unions did not want to." (Arelle interview) When pressed further, he
revealed that the CTM leader that represented GM's Ramos Arizpe" plant had refused to
cooperate with the original plan. According to David Arelle, the union leader had argued that
workers should not be required to make a down payment, particularly since regular
INFONAVIT loans did not require it. The union was unable to negotiate a better deal with GM
or INFONAVIT, and ultimately, all GM plants were excluded from the program. (Arelle
interview)
I was unable to corroborate this information with the local union, because the leader of
the CTM in Saltillo, Gaspar Gaspar, died in 1997. However, the fact that the union did not
cooperate leads to some interesting conclusions. One is that weak unions were afraid of losing
their power and did not want GM to take the credit for providing benefits. Another is that
unions do have power, although not in the ways one might imagine. By thwarting the housing
program for all GM plants, the Ramos Arizpe union leader did not behave in a manner to
3 The Ramos Arizpe plant is in the state of Coahuila outside of Saltillo, an industrial center in Mexico. This
new GM plant is a showcase of technology and is considered one of the most advanced automobile plants in the
country.
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improve the working conditions of his constituents. Since official unions such as the CTM used
to control INFONAVIT's housing allocation process before the INFONAVIT reforms of 1992,
it is very possible that unions resented the company's interference with the traditional patronage
system that existed in organized labor in Mexico. My conclusions based on this limited amount
of anecdotal evidence is that the GM union did think they could negotiate a program that did not
require down payments, but were ultimately motivated by the possibility of resurrecting the
union's role in the housing negotiation.
4.3 North American Unions: A long history of strikes
Volatile labor relations in General Motors' North American operations have been
prominent in the news for decades. The Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) and the United Auto
Workers (UAW) went on strike numerous times in the early 1990s, (see Appendix 3:Timeline of
GM Union Confrontations) at enormous cost for GM and Delphi.
How have strong unions in the US and Canada reacted to General Motors' expansion
into Mexico and did their actions shape the housing program as much as local unions did? The
traditional response of organized labor to foreign competition has been a push for trade barriers,
but this turned out to be a losing strategy when Bill Clinton signed NAFTA legislation in 1994.
In a 1996 report in the Wall Street Journal, staff reporters note "unions face huge political and
cultural obstacles to working across borders.. .unions are political organizations essentially limited
to a single country." (Davis, et al., 1996) Pharis Harvey of the International Labor Rights Fund
contends, "most workers see foreign workers as competitors, not allies [and] international
solidarity has been more rhetorical rather than real." (Davis, et al, 1996)
This division between autoworkers across borders has sparked a fierce debate. US and
Canadian autoworkers are justifiably afraid of losing their jobs to Mexicans. In 1992, Delphi
Automotive, headquartered in Troy, Michigan, laid off 42% of its United Auto Workers
members. (Lippert, 02/14/99) This lay off in the US was matched by a 32% increase in Delphi's
Mexico operations. A superficial analysis of GM/Delphi's wage structure is also quite revealing.
In GM plants in Michigan, "UAW employees receive $43/hour in salary and benefits. In Ciudad
Juirez, the average Delphi worker earns $2.25/hour in salary and benefits." (Lippert, 02/14/99)
Accusing General Motors of relocating to Mexico to find cheap labor cannot be dismissed as
mere rhetoric.
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Professor Dennis Soden of the University of Texas-El Paso, credits labor union
resistance as a major factor that has prevented General Motors from outsourcing its autoparts,
which GM has historically received from Delphi Automotive. (Soden, 1999) Other
commentators have called the Delphi-GM relationship corporate welfare, with GM continuously
purchasing parts from its inefficient subsidiary. The Delphi-GM split in 1999 was designed to
curtail this relationship and make Delphi compete for GM contracts. American labor unions
were vehemently opposed to the split, fearing that an independent Delphi could do as it pleased
with its workers, and shut down US facilities to relocate to Mexico's maquiladoras. Delphi's
downsizing started in 1988, and many of these plant closing occurred in Midwestern states, often
considered the stronghold of the United Auto Workers union. (Soden, 1999)
Accordingly, there is some evidence that labor relations in distant parts of North America
affect GM's strategy in other parts of the world, especially of maquila plants like Delphi. The
evidence of plant shut downs in the US followed by plant inaugurations in Mexico would suggest
that there is a definite connection in its worldwide activities. It is also interesting to note that
Canadian and US autoworkers used to belong to the same union, the United Auto Workers
(UAW). The 1984 creation of the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) union allowed the Big 3 Auto
companies to flaunt Canada's cheaper labor in the face of UAW workers. The Canadians formed
their own union because the UAW was representing US workers' rights during an economic
downturn in the US economy, but was forgetting about its Canadian counterparts. The interests
of Canadian workers do not necessarily coincide with the interests of American autoworkers, and
the split shows that GM autoworkers really do not have solidarity across borders, whether in
reference to the US-Canada border or the US-Mexico border. It seems counterintuitive, but even
Canadian plants have lower labor costs than US plants, which gives General Motors an extra
bargaining chip when dealing with US unions. The notion of UAW losing jobs across the border
because of lower wages is therefore true across both borders.
As we have seen, there is little solidarity among GM workers in North America. But the
more relevant question here is whether or not militant union activity in Canada and the US can
affect the company's labor practices in Mexico. By merely glancing through the list of union
confrontations, one can be confident that the UAW and CAW are active unions that have caused
GM a lot of headaches and a lot of money with strikes. The most interesting strike for purposes
of examining the Delphi housing program, are the strikes in 1996 that occurred just months
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before the housing program was announced. The strike started in March 1996 at two Delphi
plants in Lordstown, OH. Since these plants produced 90% of brake parts needed for General
Motors' plants, (Soden, 1999) the 17-day strike idled 175,800 workers, shut down 26 of its 29
plants, and cost General Motors $900 million. (Soden, 1999)
How eager was General Motors to prevent other such strikes? Just one month later, a
wildcat strike occurred at a Lordstown, OH assembly plant, but this time, rather than negotiating
with the UAW, GM obtained a federal court order to end the strike. That notion that union
activities in one part of the United States affect operations in other parts of the country is clear
for most observers, but could costly strikes in the US have been an impetus for creating the
housing program in Mexico?
The literature on the effects of unions on non-union labor shows that nonunion
companies can offer desirable benefits and compensation to deter unionism. (Freeman &
Medoff, 1983) Although firms have sought regions with low unionization rates for many years,
Delphi's tactic is slightly different. By offering an attractive benefits package, the firm might
hope to discourage workers from unionizing, and prevent costly strikes like the ones occurring in
the US. The theory asserts that workers are less likely to unionize if they feel that their current
working conditions are fair, or if they are being rewarded in kind, rather than with wages.
Previous literature has also found that non-union firms may adopt progressive work practices to
avoid unionism. (Foulkes, 1980.) This is a particularly strong argument when applied to Delphi
Automotive who was experiencing labor strikes in plants in Dayton, Ohio and must have been
eager to avoid similar problems in their expanding Mexico operations. This is a slightly different
hypothesis than Foulkes' because it suggests that union activities in the United States elicit
changes in the firm's practices in international branches.
Furthermore, the threat of unionization can improve wages and working conditions,
although not as good as they might be under collective bargaining. (Freeman & Medoff, 1983)
The "threat effect" of unions can be a strong impetus for firms to reform their human resources
practices before labor begins to organize. (Freeman & Medoff, 1983) This hypothesis is
particularly relevant for Delphi's housing program. If the company felt that the threat of
unionization in Mexico's maquiladoras was imminent, there would be a strong motive to
voluntarily supply worker benefits, in order to avoid collective bargaining agreements with unions
that could exact greater concessions from management.
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Although Freeman and Medoff were referring to the effects of unions on non-unions
within the US economy, did General Motors offer desirable benefits to deter unionization in
Mexico? All of these were examining domestic labor unions when testing this hypothesis. Also,
why did the company choose to improve benefits as opposed to compensation? What makes
Delphi's case unique is the transnational effect of the labor unions. Could high unionization in a
domestic setting affect the provision of social goods in the firm's international operation? The
United Auto Workers were prominent in Delphi's domestic plants, but unionization levels
remain low in Mexico's border region. However, as we have seen, there is little solidarity
between US workers and Mexican workers, and GM certainly did not give Mexicans benefits due
to demands from US labor unions. Quite the contrary, US workers were striking in the US to
prevent plant closings in the US which resulted from relocations to Mexico.
Although there is little or no labor organizing across borders, a related issue is the idea
that GM used Delphi as an example of how well they treated their workers in Mexico. This
would be a valuable tool when responding to US labor unions that attack GM's practices in
Mexico. In this manner, GM could take the moral high ground with respect to US workers.
All of these theories that suggest that General Motors may have offered housing benefits
to prevent unionization presume that the company felt that there was genuine threat of legitimate
labor organizing within Mexico. With the exception of Ciudad Judrez, all of Delphi's plants in
Mexico had official unions. As noted earlier, these official unions worked to maintain the status
quo. Only a legitimate threat of independent unions that could challenge the official unions could have
prompted General Motors to offer housing as a preventative measures. I have found no
evidence of such a threat in Ciudad Juirez, or in any other Mexican city. The FAT, Frente
Autentico de Trabajadores, the independent union that works with electrical workers and
autoworkers, is not a sufficient threat at the moment to suggest that GM may have needed to
offer this benefit as a preventative measure.
4.4 How Labor Views Housing Benefits
In determining how "labor" views housing benefits, it is important to note that labor is not a
homogenous entity, and there are numerous labor groups within countries. For example, even
though ostensibly the UAW and CAW represent US and Canadian autoworkers, they do not have
the same stance on compensation and benefits packages. Furthermore, different academics and
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labor organizations come from across the ideological spectrum and are likely to have different
motives and divergent views. I will briefly examine the literature on organized labor and housing
in Mexico, followed by three different perspectives on housing benefits. I have termed the
different views as the "company-town" perspective of American academics and American labor
organizers, the "living wage" perspective of non-profit organizations and of the Mexican left, and
finally, the "take it or leave it" perspective of Mexican workers will be the third view I will
examine.
Aldrete Haas notes that there are four prominent reasons why organized labor in Mexico is
interested in state housing intervention: (Aldrete Haas, 1990)
1. Public housing can improve the living condition of unionized workers
2. The 1917 Constitution established the provision of worker housing.
3. Providing housing is important not only for the legitimacy of unions, but is also "an
effective means to reward and control organized labor's rank and file." (Aldrete Haas,
1990, p. 42)
4. State housing provides business opportunities for the construction companies of labor
leaders.
The Mexican housing agency, INFONAVIT, was formed during Echeverria's administration
in 1972 and was composed of three important parties: the state, the private sector and organized
labor. The decision to make organized labor an official partner in the housing agency has meant
that the CTM, one of the PRI's official labor unions, dominated the housing allocation process
for many years. When INFONAVIT implemented its reforms in 1992, one observer noted that
this new arrangement "upset Mexico's labor unions which will no longer be able to hand out
houses to workers or receive kickbacks for favors rendered." (Fraser, 1992) Starting in 1993, the
housing agency would now use a new, non-discretionary formula to allocate loans to qualified
workers. (Mansell Carstens, April 1992) It is therefore important to note that oficial labor unions had once
controlled the housing allocation process, had lost the privilege in 1992, and that the General Motors'program was
actually taking organized labor'sformer role in the allocation of housing credits.
General Motors initiated the housing program without any input from labor and furthermore,
there is no evidence that employees actually approached the company to request housing
benefits. As seen in Chapter 5, the impetus for the program came from the construction
industry, not from the labor movement.
In an interview with Lee Crawford, former President of Delphi-Mexico, I asked him why
General Motors had decided to offer the program only to Delphi employees, and purposely
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exclude General Motors' employees. Crawford's response was that it was a "different situation,
with different workers that had different needs." (Crawford interview) When I posed the same
question to David Arelle, owner of the construction company, he responded that it was the labor
unions in Ramos Arizpe that did not want the housing benefits. (Arelle interview)
Can it be true that a Mexican labor union" actually refused housing benefits? Although the
answer is counter intuitive for many American who are familiar with traditional labor unions, in
the case of Mexico, it is possible that unions sought to thwart the housing program. Before the
1992 reforms of INFONAVIT, labor unions essentially controlled the housing allocation process
of INFONAVIT. The increased transparency that resulted from INFONAVIT's new
qualification system, made it more difficult for labor leaders to award housing benefits through
the state-housing agency. Furthermore, unions had experienced a severe erosion of their power
in the Salinas administration in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Not only was the CTM, losing its
power vis-A-vis the state, but now, US firms were showing up the labor unions by providing
benefits to workers without allowing the unions to take the credit. Analyzing why the Ramos
Arizpe plant did not participate in the housing program is unfortunately pure speculation, but it is
an interesting analysis of the perverse incentive structure of Mexican unions and the relationships
between firms, unions, and workers.
In turning to the perspective of leftist academics, it is interesting to note that almost
unanimously, academics were suspicious of Delphi's motives for offering the program. Professor
Irasema Coronado of the University of Texas, El Paso immediately drew parallels with Arizona
mining towns in the early 1900s. Similarly, Professor Diane Davis of MIT likened Delphi's
housing program to the Pullman Company town in Pullman, Illinois. This "company town"
perspective of housing benefits views the benefits as a means to control labor. Because the
company is responsible for an employee's housing, a worker is indebted to its employer and the
safety and economic security of their family is in the hands of the company. The creation of
company towns refers to towns that exist purely to benefit a company and economies, which are
centered on the firm's activities. Social reformers criticize company towns believing that
excessive company involvement in workers' lives is manipulative and infringes on workers' rights.
(Housing Facts & Findings, 2000, p. 7) The company owns the housing, runs the company
38 I used this hypothetical response because Gaspar Valdes Valdes, the CTM union leader of Saltillo in the state
of Coahuila, died in 1997. His successor, Tereso Medino Ramirez, was unavailable for comment.
-60-
stores, employees all the town's population, and control the town in every sense. From a
management perspective, the rationale for company towns is that good company housing and
good living conditions make good people, but more importantly, good people made good
workers. (Reynolds, 1983)
The history of company towns proves that the model industrial towns 39 that emerged at
the turn of the 2 0 th Century in the US were not motivated purely by philanthropic desires.
George McMurtry, a steel and iron magnate of the late 1800s and early 1900s, contracted a
respected landscape architecture firm to design the model industrial town of Vandergrift,
Pennsylvania which opened in 1900. McMurtry's company town had the explicit purpose of
combining "social reform, urban design, comprehensive infrastructure planning, and private
home ownership principles." (Mosher, 1995, p. 84) However, just like in Delphi's case 100 years
later, McMurtry had other motives, beyond social reform.
Steel producers across the United States were experiencing labor problems which
prompted Carnegie Steel to eliminate unions after the union contracts ran out in the spring of
1892. A violent altercation occurred in their Homestead Mill, but the Pennsylvania militia
intervened to quell the resistance and re-open a non-union mill. Perhaps closer to home for
McMurtry, the neighboring steel mill in Apollo went on strike in 1893-1894. These two high
profile union strikes, in addition to other violent episodes in Chicago's Haymarket and in
Pullman, Illinois, were strong motives for George McMurtry. (Mosher, 1995) Interestingly
enough, McMurtry's work paid off in the end when loyal steel workers in Vandergrift helped
their owner break an important strike against the entire US Steel Corporation in 1901. (Mosher,
1995, p. 84) At an anti-union meeting in July 1901, 57 Vandergrift steel workers spoke in
support of the steel company, believing that at McMurtry's mills, they received good wages AND
got to live in a moral and model industrial town. (Mosher, 1995, p. 101) McMurtry's model
town was so useful in deterring the threat of unions, that in 1906, US Steel modeled the industrial
city of Gary, Indiana after Vandergrift.
The company town is more than just a model of cooperation between capital and labor
designed to prevent unionization, however. Examples from both Pullman, Illinois and from
Vandergrift, Pennsylvania show that a positive return on real estate investments was a critical part
39 Model industrial towns existed in Europe in the late 1800s as well. Le Creusot, France, the Krupp estates near
Essen, Germany, and several British factory villages helped George McMurtry avoid some of the problems that
previous company towns had confronted. (Mosher, 1995)
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of the design of the company town. George Pullman and his investors fixed rents in Pullman in
order to secure a 6% return. (Mosher, 1995, p. 91) In 1894 during difficult financial times,
workers could not afford Pullman's shelter, and demanded either lower rents or a fixed minimum
wage. If the company refused, moving out of the company town or rebellion against the Pullman
Company were the only options for workers. (Mosher, 1995)
George McMurtry benefited from hindsight and learned from Pullman's experience.
Instead of pursuing rental housing, McMurtry's company town followed the lead of European
company towns (Le Creusot and Krupp), which promoted home ownership. For McMurtry and
for Delphi Automotive, the advantages of home ownership included the fact that by owning
residential property, workers could take pride in their homes and build equity. Additionally, fixed
investments in housing forced workers to make financial commitments to the town and to their
jobs. Finally, for investors in real estate ventures, the burden of maintaining housing and
infrastructure was shifted from the company to the workers. (Mosher, 1995, p. 91)
The fact that housing needed to be affordable for workers made companies become more
creative with housing finance. Andrew Carnegie's alternative to the McMurtry model included
offering low-interest loans for housing near the US Steel plant of Homestead in Munhall,
Pennsylvania. (Edel, Sclar, and Luria, 1984) In 1896, McMurtry followed Carnegie's low-interest
financing just as Delphi would do 100 years later in Mexico. However, in the case of Delphi
Automotive, private sector investors did not have to finance the low-interest loans because the
Mexican government agencies of INFONAVIT and FOVI provided these subsidies which
benefited both homeowners and investors. Homeowners would have affordable loans, and
investors could secure a larger market without having to shoulder the risk and the capital of the
investment.
Just as we will see in Delphi housing, the Vandergrift housing gave priority to loyal
workers. According to Anne Mosher, "loyal workers" were those workers that had replaced
striking workers during the Apollo strike of 1893-1894. Also, because of elevated costs of
housing, in both cases, higher skilled workers were the ones who could afford to buy housing.
Another analogy between Vandergrift's company town and Delphi's employer assisted
housing can be drawn with respect to the housing of the lowest income workers. In Vandergrift,
the bottom of the worker hierarchy were mainly immigrants and ended up settling in small
shanties without sewers or running water in a settlement called Morning Sun. (Mosher, 1995, p.
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98) Similarly with Delphi, the line workers at the company's maquiladoras were excluded from
the program and continue to reside in the un-serviced shacks in the colonias on the periphery of
the city.
The company town has been modified by Delphi for several reasons. Although most of
Delphi's plants are located in maquiladora towns whose economies are dominated by
maquiladoras, it is not accurate to say that Delphi controls the economy of these towns. Delphi
may be the largest employer in many of these towns, (as it is Ciudad Judrez) but there are
alternative employment opportunities in all of these maquiladora cities. Similarly, the company
town characterization applies to housing which is owned by the company. Unlike the company
town in Pullman, Illinois which involved rental housing for workers, the Delphi program allows
Delphi employers to become homeowners. As seen in Chapter 2 in the description of the
housing program, if a worker leaves Delphi, they may still be indebted to the company to repay
their down payment, but the title of their home is controlled by either INFONAVIT or
Hipotecaria Su Casita, the FOVI service provider that originates and services FOVI loans for the
Delphi housing program.
A second popular view of Delphi's housing program was the "living wage" response.
Victor Mufioz, a former AFL-CIO representative based in El Paso, immediately responded that
instead of offering housing benefits, the maquiladoras should be more concerned with giving
their employees a decent wage. (Mufioz interview) The Inter-Faith Council on Corporate
Responsibility (ICCR) agrees. Since 1989, the ICCR, a dissident shareholder group composed of
religious institutional investors, has been pressuring US companies to pay their workers a living
wage. Sister Barbara Glendon, the Catholic nun who leads the ICCR, says, "We feel the housing
is a compassionate response, but a just response.. .as long as workers are not receiving a living
wage, GM sill has an obligation to look at increasing the wage base." (Blumenstein & Solis, 1997)
Furthermore, General Motors is accused of starting the housing program "after benefiting from
low Mexican wages for 20 years." (Blumenstein & Solis, 1997)
Delphi's official company response to the living wage attacks is to note that Delphi pays a
"competitive" wage in Mexico and that even if they did raise their workers' wages, they still
would not be able to buy a house. (Crawford interview; Diaz interview) By competitive wage,
the company is referring to Mexico's minimum wage, which for most observers can hardly be
considered a competitive wage at $4.61/day. Furthermore, paying more than the prevailing wage
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rate would "damage its own competitiveness in a cutthroat global economy and hurt Mexican-
owned companies compelled to respond by matching the higher wages." (Blumenstein & Solis,
1997)
While it may be true that a raise would not make a worker eligible for a commercial
mortgage, a raise could make a worker eligible for government subsidized housing. Under the
Delphi-INFONAVIT agreement, only workers making 1.7 times the minimum wage could
qualify for the housing program. By instituting a wage structure in which some line workers
received raises and made $7.84/day, (1.7 times the minimum wages) General Motors could have
increased the number of workers that had access to INFONAVIT housing. For only $3.22/ day
more, the company could have made a real impact on the lives of its line workers. The fact that
they chose not to offer raises is evidence to suggest that providing housing for the poor was not
Delphi's main concern.
The third perspective of the housing benefit is the Mexican worker's view - the "take it
or leave it" perspective. As seen in Chapter 2, most of the workers that qualified for housing
were not the poorest line workers, but were frequently entry-level office assistants. For these
workers, the quality of INFONAVIT housing was not an enticing worker benefit. For line
workers that did not make enough money to qualify for the program, the housing benefit was a
distant goal. The average line worker would probably have to work at Delphi for several years
before moving up in the ranks enough to fulfill the minimum wage requirement. Even then, the
lower priced housing had been capped at 3 0%, so the lower-end of the income distribution at
Delphi's plants had to compete for these housing credits. Finally, every Mexican worker was
eligible for an INFONAVIT house, with or without Delphi's assistance. Regardless of whether
or not you worked for Delphi, workers in the formal sector all made contributions to
INFONAVIT and could all participate in the standard qualification procedures to receive
housing credits. This was a long process that could take many years, but this was also true for
line workers at Delphi. For most of the workers I interviewed, the housing benefits were not
viewed as a revolutionary benefit that could entice workers to seek Delphi employment, thus
generating an attitude I have called "take it or leave it."
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4.5 Conclusions
Do union activities in Ottawa and Indiana affect a company's decisions in Mexico?
Could expensive union confrontations in Canada and the United States motivate General Motors
to take preventative action in Mexico? This is an intriguing hypothesis with plenty of evidence of
worker dissatisfaction in the US and Canada. However, the weakness of Mexican labor unions
and general worker dissatisfaction with unions make it implausible that General Motors officials
in Detroit felt a real threaten from Mexican labor movements. There is insufficient evidence to
suggest that GM and Delphi workers were actually seeking legitimate labor representation.
Furthermore, after years of dealing with cooperative unions, it would appear that GM had
nothing to fear from Mexican workers. Perhaps more disturbing, General Motors had learned to
deal with the Mexican government, and there was no evidence that the Mexican president would
support dramatic wage increases or a genuine reform of the labor union system. Without
evidence of a valid worker threat or of a political threat in the form of progressive Mexican
administrations, I cannot conclude that GM started its employer assisted housing program with
the intention of preventing union formation.
The fact that line workers did not receive housing benefits is additional evidence that
anti-unionization was not a motive in Delphi's decision to offer housing benefits. The fact that a
disproportionate number of houses went to office personnel that do not typically belong to
unions suggests that Delphi did not feel that it had to satisfy its line workers as a preventative
measure to avoid union formation.
Additionally, Mexican workers were completely disillusioned with corrupt labor unions,
and for most workers, the only thing that unions did was deduct union fees from their weekly
paychecks. For those workers that have a collective history with unions, there was little incentive
to unionize with official unions. Similarly for younger workers in Juirez with little history of
labor movements, there exists a weak consciousness of labor movements and the potential
benefits of unionization. Finally, the fact that many companies actually wanted official unions in
their companies to control the labor force is further evidence that there was no reason for Delphi
Mexico to fear a costly labor uprising. The fact that militant unions in Canada and the United
States were striking against Delphi and General Motors is insufficient evidence to prove that
Delphi management feared a similar uprising from Mexican workers.
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A more plausible hypothesis might be that Delphi wanted to be able to control skilled
labor, without particular reference to unionization. However, since most of the higher wage
skilled labor did not receive down payment assistance from Delphi, the company did not control
workers' mobility in any tangible way. These skilled laborers were free to leave Delphi and
continue making mortgage payments at whatever company they were working at. Only the
intangible creation of worker loyalty associated with the housing benefits could have kept skilled
workers at Delphi. However, there is no evidence to prove that Delphi initiated the housing
program with the intent to control skilled labor.
Taking a moral high ground with respect to belligerent US unions may have been a
consequence of the program, but as an isolated variable, it does not seem to be sufficient
incentive for GM to start the program. Just as was seen in Chapter 3, turnover and public
relations are also insufficient incentives to motivate a profit-maximizing firm like General Motors
to commit $8 million in an employee-housing program. Although US unions have led costly
strikes, it does not appear that GM had reason to fear similar uprising in Mexico. If the program
was not explicitly started to affect labor, why did the program emerge? As I will show in the next
chapter, profit motives of US companies interested in investing in the Mexican housing industry
had the greatest incentives to encourage the Delphi housing program.
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Chapter 5
The Construction Industry, US Capital & INFONAVIT
The Mexican construction industry has a close relationship with government agencies
that finance and subsidize housing construction for social interest housing. This has been well
documented by many housing analysts, but what is most interesting is the important role of
Mexican construction companies in creating the INFONAVIT housing saving program and
ultimately in selling the idea to US multinational firms, both to Delphi, the recipient of housing
benefits, and to Pulte, the mortgage finance firm.
In most countries, housing construction is a domestic affair. In Mexico, the housing
market had a volatile history in the 1980s and 1990s with dramatic currency fluctuations,
nationalization of the banking system, and a series of economic and financial crises that crippled
the banking sector. It is therefore surprising to find US investors interested in Mexico's volatile
housing market. The role of FOVI and the World Bank in subsidizing intermediary mortgage
lending institutions (SOFOLES) will be analyzed to understand why US companies were drawn
to Mexico. Additionally, I will examine the role of NAFTA in opening the Mexican financial
markets which coincides with the timing of the Delphi housing investments.
Finally, I will demonstrate that even though there is no evidence that Delphi realized direct
profits by housing its workers, another GM subsidiary was directly involved in the housing
industry, and would eventually become a source of capital for Pulte's operations in Mexico. The
possibility that GM actually profited from its worker-housing program through GMAC and
GMAC-RFC's involvement in the mortgage market and through financing schemes with Pulte
Mortgage Company is an important incentive for General Motors since the housing program
would generate business for another GM subsidiary. Among the hypotheses that I have
explored, the role of construction interests and US sources of capital is perhaps the most
powerful, because it opens up the possibility of direct financial gain by US companies investing in
Mexico's housing industry, consistent with the Neoclassical profit-maximizing motives of the
firm.
5.1 The History of Real Estate Developers and Public Policy
There is an exhaustive literature on the active role of real estate interests in forming public
policy in cities around the world. Big business is typically a prominent actor in policy decisions,
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and in particular, in real estate. Whether it is in New York, Bangkok, Paris, or Mexico City,
speculative land developers, construction companies, and real estate interests have frequently
dominated the urban political landscape. "Common interests of both government and [real
estate] developers in maximizing the potential return on a site allows flourishing public-private
partnerships." (Fainstein, 1994, p. 108) The public-private partnership that emerges in Ciudad
JuArez is more complex than the one Fainstein describes, since it involves multiple actors and a
different kind of "return." Although Delphi plays a key role in tying up the deal, ultimately, this
program was a partnership between Pulte-Condak Construction and INFONAVIT, and between
Pulte-Su Casita and FOVI. I am also modifying Fainstein's theory slightly because Delphi's
financial return is actually passed on to another one of General Motors' subsidiaries that is
actively involved in the Mexican mortgage market.
In Mexico, many political analysts and housing specialists have scrutinized real estate
developers, and in particular, their relationship with INFONAVIT. There are three main groups
with vested interests in Mexico's state housing intervention: the construction industry and
construction firms, landowners, and industrialists. (Aldrete Haas, 1990, p.38) Aldrete-Haas goes
on to note that in Mexico, "financiers or land owners are often owners of construction
companies."
The following section describes the Mexican housing market. It is clear that real estate
developers view partnerships with the Mexican government as a key characteristic of residential
housing, whether dealing with the construction process, or with the mortgage lending process.
5.2 The Housing Market in Mexico - INFONAVIT, FOVI, & SOFOLES
The character of the Mexican mortgage market differs dramatically from its US counterpart"
in that public sector agencies are primary actors in almost all mortgages. In particular, two
Mexican government agencies dominate the Mexican mortgage market, either by providing direct
financing, or by providing subsidies for intermediaries known as SOFOLES. In 2001,
INFONAVIT's share of the low-income housing market was 70%, while the other three Mexican
housing agencies (FOVI, FOVISSSTE, and FONHAPO) accounted for 27% of that same
market. Commercial banks only represented 3% of the low-income housing market in 2001. (US
40 Unlike in the United States, where most of the government's intervention in housing is indirect assistance
through a system of incentives or tax credits, the Mexican government has historically been extremely active in
actual housing construction and direct financing for low-income workers.
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Commercial Service, 2002) This is an important characteristic of the Mexican housing market,
because 97% of the country's formal sector homes are a result of interaction between private
sector developers and Mexican government agencies.
INFONAVIT
Since its inception in 1972, INFONAVIT has undergone dramatic institutional changes
with the various presidential administrations. The housing agency was started as a tripartite
agreement between the state, organized labor, and the private sector, and was originally involved
with actual housing construction and land acquisition. Four years before the innovative housing
program began in Juirez, the Mexican government had ordered a dramatic reform of the housing
agency. Effective as of May 1992, INFONAVIT would undergo a radical transformation from a
construction agency into a housing bank. (Fraser, 1992) Beginning in January 1993,
INFONAVIT was no longer allowed to purchase land or construct worker housing. Instead, the
reformed agency would issue mortgages to workers and make loans to construction companies
for worker housing.
It is no secret that housing is an important political reward in Mexico. Some scholars
claim that President Echeverria started INFONAVIT in the 1970s to reward labor for their
support during his administration's austerity measures. "Conflict between the state and labor
arose around control over the allocation of housing. Whoever controlled the distribution of
dwellings could use them as political rewards." (Aldrete-Haas, 1990, p. 130) Previously, one of
INFONAVIT's most egregious faults had been constructing poor quality homes and "assigning
construction contracts in a preferential and inefficient manner." (Mansell Carstens, 1992) The
agency was no longer responsible for housing construction, which was now the responsibility of
private developers. Private developers and INFONAVIT retained strong ties. (Mexico Housing
Market Study, 1999, p. 9) However, despite periodic changes in INFONAVIT laws, according to
experts, the agency "still has substantial nontransparent elements in its allocation of construction
financing." (Mexico Housing Market Study, 1999, p. 15)
Working with INFONAVIT has in many ways become a special business. Some
Mexican construction companies specialize in working with this housing giant, and have carved
out niches to work with Mexican agencies to secure low-income housing credits. In an interview
with the owner of a Mexican construction company, he relayed to me this insight::
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"To be profitable in the low-income housing market, you really need to have a
large volume of contracts. You can't survive in that market of the construction
industry unless you can sell INFONAVIT a large quantity of houses to cover
your costs." (Gonzalez interview.)
Grupo Condak's original contract with INFONAVIT for 6000 homes was worth US$80 million
and is exactly the type of partnership that the construction company wanted.
FOVI
FOVI, Fund for the Operation of Bank Housing Finance, is the other major Mexican
government agency that provides loans for social interest housing in Mexico. FOVI was
designed in 1963 by the Mexican Central Bank to fill the gap between low-income workers and
private sector banks. Since the mid-1990s, FOVI has worked with private sector SOFOLES,
financial intermediaries which originate and service mortgages for Mexican workers. After
INFONAVIT, FOVI is the second largest originator of mortgages in Mexico and in 1998,
originated 18% of all mortgages through authorized lending agents. (Bernstein, 1998)
FOVI seeks to provide financing for workers that frequently earn too much to qualify for
INFONAVIT loans. To receive a FOVI credit, workers must make between 1.5 -15 minimum
wages. (Mexico Housing Market Study, 1999) However, the agency's efforts were concentrated on
those households that earned between 3-6 minimum wages' in 1995. (Lea & Bernstein, 1995)
Unlike INFONAVIT which is financed by a 5% employer contribution through a direct payroll
deduction, FOVI does not raise capital from worker contributions.
According to Steven Bernstein, chief economist at GNMA and former advisor to the
Mexican government, "FOVI is one of the least subsidized and best run government housing
finance institutions in the country." (Bernstein, 1998) The current head of FOVI, Manuel
Zepeda is a man that is so well-respected and known for his honesty in Mexican government,
that the Fox administration re-appointed him as head of FOVI despite Zepeda's original
appointment in PRI administrations. (Bernstein interview) As a result of its low level of
subsidies and solid management, the World Bank chose FOVI as the best candidate for a
transition from government subsidized lender to a more sustainable source of lending.
(Bernstein, 1998)
41 Recall that Delphi's salary program through FOVI awarded homes to Delphi workers that made 12-13
minimum wages, twice the level of the agency's target audience.
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In 1999, FOVI received a $505 million loan from the World Bank to increase funds for
FOVI housing. (Mexico Housing Market Study, 1999, p. 14) The 3-year World Bank loan was
intended to cover the costs of developing the secondary mortgage market, with FOVI acting as
the 'master server.' (Moore, 1998) Manuel Zepeda believes the biggest challenge is bringing in
conduits of capital "like GE Capital and GMAC." (Moore, 1998) Attracting GMAC was
specifically cited as one of the important parts in developing the Mexican mortgage market.
In addition to offering servicing and origination fees for the private sector and subsidized
interest rates, FOVI also provides the private sector with risk mitigation in the housing finance
sector. According to a report by Santander Investments, "FOVI already operates a system in
which the private sector can participate in mortgage lending with 50% of the risk." (Serrano,
2000) This is because although the SOFOL services loans, FOVI provides a 50% guarantee
against loss. (Erb, 1999)
In 1989, FOVI began a system of public auctions to promote transparency and fairness in
loan distributions. (Mexico Housing Market Study, 1999, p. 16) In 1998 when the Delphi salary
program was implemented, Hipotecaria4 2 Su Casita, a subsidiary of Pulte Corporation, was able to
avoid the formal competitive bid procedure because of the GM-INFONAVIT agreement, and
ostensibly because of special agreements with FOVI.
SOFOLES
The SOFOL, Sociedad Financiera de Objeto Limitado or limited scope financial society,
emerged in the wake of NAFTA in the early 1990s. NAFTA negotiations called upon the
Mexican government to open up its relatively closed financial markets. SOFOLES were the new
financial intermediaries that allowed US and Canadian investors to become involved in financing
without requiring a full banking license from the Ministry of Finance. (Pickering, 2000, p. 3)
Because SOFOLES are non-depositary institutions, they rely on FOVI, the Mexican government
housing trust, to fund mortgage loans. (Marez, 2000) Although SOFOLES are privately owned,
they must follow FOVI guidelines that borrows must satisfy to qualify for FOVI-funded loans.
Natalie Pickering distinguished between three types of SOFOLES in Mexico: 1)
Independent and predominantly Mexican-owned SOFOLES 2) those that belong to larger
Mexican financial firms and 3) those associated with a foreign corporation. (Pickering, 2000, p.
4 Hipotecaria means mortgage bank in Spanish and Su Casita means your little house.
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5) Furthermore, of the 32 SOFOLES that were licensed and operating in the year 2000, only 19
were licensed to operate in mortgages, and of those, 14 were FOVI-authorized lenders.
(Pickering, 2000, p. 5) This distinction of ownership and FOVI authorization is an important
one, and this paper will examine those SOFOLES associated with US firms and those that are
lending under the auspices of FOVI in the mortgage market.
The SOFOLES have benefited from their special relationship with FOVI. For the
SOFOLES, origination and servicing fees provided by FOVI subsidies are the main source of
profits, unlike most traditional lending institutions that profit from interest payments. (Bernstein
interview) US firms became increasingly attracted to the new financial institutions in no small
part due to the subsidies available and the high profits associated with them. Additionally,
SOFOLES have a special relationship with developers who are keenly interested in securing
mortgage financing for the homes they construct. (Pickering, 2000)
5.3 Mexican Construction Companies and Housing Finance
Grupo Condak
The idea of the GM-INFONAVIT partnership originated with the Condak Construction
Company according to journalist Claire Poole of Latin Trade. David Arelle, owner of Grupo
Condak, agrees that it was Condak that approached General Motors with the idea of worker
housing, after cooperating with INFONAVIT to create the program Binomio Ahorro Hogar.
(Arelle interview) General Motors CEO Jack Smith and Delphi director Lee Crawford would
later claim that the program emerged out of the company's concern for their Mexican workers.
Although this may be true, Delphi was not the party to initiate the housing partnership and was
prompted by the construction industry.
In Mexico, the construction industry was dependent on public sector contracts both for
major infrastructure projects, as well as for residential and non-residential building. The director
of Mexico's National Chamber of the Construction Industry (CNIC) noted the importance of the
industry by saying that "construction is the leading economic sector and will continue to be so."
(Hilbert, March 1994)
However, after the devaluation of the peso in December 1994, the Mexican economy
went into a tailspin which was catastrophic for the construction industry. Construction costs sky
rocketed, as did interest rates on home loans. Difficulty with monetary policy was coupled with a
fiscal crisis in the Mexican government. President Zedillo was forced to implement an austerity
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program that cut public spending, including construction industry contracts. Public sector
construction also decreased due to privatization. (Hilbert, March 1994)
In addition to the government's spending cuts, the private sector was unable to get
financing for construction due to the devaluation and high unemployment rates, which
exacerbated the industries problems, since both public and private sector were reducing their
demand. A spokesman for the Camara Nacional de la Industria de la Construccidn (CNIC) predicted
that construction was one of the industries hardest hit by Mexico's financial problems, and
experienced a 15.5% reduction in production in 1995. (Fonseca Garcia, 06/01/1995)
Partnerships with Mexican housing agency would prove to be absolutely critical, since the private
sector was not issuing mortgages in this economically precarious period in 1995.
Grupo Condak was desperately in need of contracts in 1995. In 1994, prior to the collapse
of the peso, Grupo Condak had built 2000 homes in Ciudad Junrez. Just one year later, the
company built only 100 homes, in an industry that relies on high volume construction 3 for profit.
Pulte and Grupo Condak decided it would be mutually beneficial to team up to build worker
housing in Ciudad Junrez. Condak could bring local expertise to the team and Pulte could
cooperate with big American companies and provide the capital to begin the program. The ailing
construction company received a blessing from the national housing agency just at the moment
when bankruptcy appeared to be the only other alternative.
43 Due to the administrative work involved with INFONAVIT housing and to the low-income housing, profits
were low unless high volume housing was produced.
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Mortgage Financing In Mexico
GMAC AND PULTE CORPORATION
PARTNERS AND ACQUISITIONS (1994-2001)
Source: Data compiled by author from business magazines
But how did David Arelle's faltering construction company get so lucky to receive the
6000-credit INFONAVIT contract? The Binomio Ahorro Hogar program was a special external
promotion by INFONAVIT, but instead of having a public auction for the contract, Delphi and
Grupo Condak were able to negotiate the terms of the housing program directly with
INFONAVIT without interruption from other bidders. According to a confidential source
within Delphi Automotive, although "nothing illegal" happened, the reason that Grupo Condak
got the INFONAVIT contract was because David Arelle was a childhood friend of Alfredo Del
Mazo,44 the Director of INFONAVIT. This personal connection explains in part why the
construction contract may have been awarded without a competitive bid procedure.
In addition to connections on the national level with INFONAVIT and the PRI, David
Arelle had local connections that facilitated acquiring land for his real estate ventures. Promotora
de la Industria Chihuahuense, a parastatal agency in Chihuahua that promotes industrial
development, was embroiled in several scandals in 1997 regarding its sale of industrial land to
commercial developers. One of the irregularities involved the sale of serviced industrial lots to
David Arelle. During the previous PAN administration" (1990-1996), the parastatal agency sold
120 hectares of public land at the below-market price of 10 pesos per square meter and allowed
Arelle to purchase the land with only a verbal promise of payment. Arelle re-sold 60 hectares to
INFONAVIT at 30 pesos per meter and used the proceeds to pay the Promotora. (Quezada,
1997) As the Diario de Chihuahua (the local newspaper) would comment, "this triangular
operation allowed for juicy profits" and was a risk-free profit opportunity for Arelle, who was
able to purchase the remaining 60 hectares with the profits from the sale to INFONAVIT.
(Quezada, 1997) No formal investigation was ever conducted on this irregularity of the sale of
public land, in part because "industrialists were interested in having worker housing near their
factories." (Quezada, 1997)
44 The source from Delphi told me the two attended school together and have known each other since childhood.
Since Del Mazo is a public figure, his background was easier to corroborate. Del Mazo was born in Toluca,
Mexico on Dec. 31, 1943 and attended primary school in Toluca, preparatory studies at Mary Brothers School,
Centro Universitario Mexico, and received his business degree from UNAM in 1966. (Camp, 1995) David
Arelle Sergent was born on September 17, 1947 in Mexico City; D.F. Information on his educational background
was not readily available in the press or in printed material. The two influential men are only four years apart, so
although they were not necessarily classmates, it is likely that there families knew each other in Mexico City.
45 The PAN party was in power in Chihuahua when these irregularities occurred. When the opposition PRI came
in to power, several legislators wanted to examine the situation, but ultimately, no formal investigation was
conducted.
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Although the local media in Chihuahua does not specify that Arelle's questionable land
transaction was related to the Delphi housing project, in 1996, there was no other company that
was actively involved in employee housing. Regardless of Delphi's involvement in this particular
land deal, having a reliable Mexican partner who knows to acquire strategic serviced lots could be
a valuable part of the housing partnership for Delphi who wanted their workers housed as close
to the maquilas as possible. For Condak's other business partners, (including Pulte) having a
partner that knows how to do business in Mexico is a desirable trait for newcomers into the
market.
As of January 2002, Grupo Condak is one of the largest constructors of INFONAVIT
housing in Ciudad Juairez. Although the construction market is very fragmented with dozens of
small companies, Jose Luis Garza, the Director of INFONAVIT in the Ciudad Juirez office,
confirmed that of the 20-25 firms that receive INFONAVIT contracts, three construction
companies are the clear leaders. Grupo Condak and Grupo Ruba each constructed 3000
INFONAVIT homes the previous year, and Grupo Ibasa came in third with slightly less than
3000 housing credits per year. (Garza interview) This is fairly typical of the construction
industry in Mexican cities, which frequently have dozens of smaller firms, but each city has one
or two large construction companies that dominate INFONAVIT contracts.
Due to competition in the saturated Mexico City market and due to the fact that one local
firm (Corporaci6n Geo) already dominates the Federal District, Grupo Condak has concentrated
its expansion on other markets, such as Ciudad JuArez. Condak would also service the other
industrial cities with Delphi factories: Chihuahua, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, Matamoros,
Monterrey, and Saltillo. For the Mexican construction company, the Delphi housing agreement
was a way for the construction company to get a foothold on new urban markets in northern
Mexico.
5.4 US capital in Mexico's housing industry
Since the December 1994 currency crisis and the ensuing economic crisis that crippled
Mexico in 1995, commercial banks have disappeared from the residential mortgage industry due
to the high default rates that followed the crisis. (Bernstein, 1998) Additionally, the presence of
subsidized loans in the market meant that commercial banks could not compete with the
government housing agencies, and in essence, INFONAVIT and FOVI had crowded out private
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sector participation in the Mexican housing industry. Why then were US investors interested in
investing in Mexico's housing sector?
One explanation is that Mexico's recent economic history can be divided into pre-
devaluation business prospects and the post-devaluation business atmosphere with December
1994 being the critical date that marked the turning point. There is substantial evidence that
before the devaluation of the peso, international investors were optimistic about Mexico's future.
As recently as 1992, commercial banks provided 70.5 % of new mortgage loans in Mexico,
(Barry, et al, 1994) compared with less than 3% only 5 years later. In mid-1994, analysts of
Mexico's mortgage market gave the industry favorable evaluations. (Ross & Johansson, 1994;
Barry, et al, 1994) Mortgage lending by commercial banks actually went up in the early 1990s,
and the Mexican government was actively working to improve legislation to reduce costs
associated with property transfer, appraisal, and registration. (Lea & Bernstein, 1995) At this
time, the World Bank held seminars designed to encourage investors to take a closer at
securitizing Mexican mortgages. (Pickering interview) In 1994, the Mortgage Bankers
Association hosted international housing conference in Guadalajara, Mexico and Pedro Aspe, the
former finance minister in Mexico, spoke about his efforts to establish a secondary mortgage
market in Mexico. (Taylor, 2000) In general, there was a keen interest both inside and outside of
Mexico for developing a market for mortgage-backed securities. (Barry, et al, 1995, p. 194)
The excitement over Mexico's mortgage market was not just limited to academic
commentators and to World Bank incentives, however. US firms had begun to form
partnerships in the housing market, putting their money on the line. Beazer Homes and Pulte
Mortgage were two of the earliest US companies to invest their capital in Mexico's market
through strategic partnerships with Mexican construction companies. US companies were
actually lured into Mexico's market before the economy crashed in December 1994, and in the
case of the Pulte Corporation, managed to pull itself out of a precarious financial situation
through a series of contracts financed with Mexican government (FOVI) subsidies. This section
shows how General Motors' subsidiaries became involved in the mortgage market, at a time
when the prospects for developing a secondary mortgage market in Mexico appeared to be
bright. (See Appendix 1: Timeline of Pulte and GMAC Expansions in the Mexican Mortgage
Market.)
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Pulte Mortgage Company
Michael Marez, senior vice-president of Pulte Mortgage, cited three reasons for Pulte's
expansion into Mexico's market: 1) the saturation of US housing markets, 2) the desire to get a
stronghold in new markets and 3) profit opportunities. (Taylor, September 1998) Although the
mortgage banker listed profit motives last on his list, Pulte's major investment in Mexico, a
SOFOL called Su Casita, made a 40% return on investment" from 1995-1998. (Mexico's Housing
Market Study, 1999, p. 18) SOFOLES servicing fees are comparable to US servicing fees,
however in Mexico, these fees stay fairly constant over the life of the loan, while in the US,
servicing fees decline with declining loan balance and due to US inflation. (Pickering, 2000, p. 15)
Marez also spelled out Pulte's contribution in Mexico. "In Mexico, capital was a big factor for
establishing homebuilding and mortgage operations and we had the capital." (Taylor, September
1998)
Hipotecaria Su Casita
Hipotecaria Su Casita (or simply 'Su Casita') was one of the first SOFOLES and opened in
1994, shortly after the new mortgage institutions were created. By 1995, Su Casita formed a
partnership with the US homebuilder, Pulte Mortgage Corporation who became a shareholder 4
in the new SOFOL. These first years were difficult times for the new SOFOL, but by 1997, Su
Casita secured 700 mortgages with FOVI through Delphi's salary housing program. This deal
would mark the turning point in the company's operations, as it went from a position of near
bankruptcy and was transformed into a profitable mortgage lender.
By the year 2001, Su Casita became the largest loan originator in the market" with 15,228
credits representing 31% of new mortgages in the sector. (See Figure 2) With a loan portfolio of
over $1billion and with 56 Su Casita offices4" in Mexico in 2001, the US SOFOL had expanded
significantly since 1995 and is the second largest SOFOL in terms of total capital and overall
portfolio with over 45,000 mortgages in 2001. (Su Casita website) Pulte's fellow shareholders in
Su Casita include the International Finance Corporation, the private sector lender of the World
46 SOFOLES profits have been impressive across the board. The 7 largest lenders averaged a 38% return on
equity in 1998 (Pickering, 2000, p. 14) making SOFOLES a very profitable enterprise.
47 According to NAFTA legislation, the foreign companies were only allowed to have a maximum of 49%
ownership in a SOFOL during the NAFTA transition period. (1994-1999) Starting in 2000, the barriers to entry
for foreign financial institutions were lifted. (Pickering, 2000, p.5)
48 This includes loans it acquired by purchasing another SOFOL called Financiamento Azteca or Finazte,
acquired in 2001.
49 Statistics from Internet Securities, Inc from South American Business Information, September 25, 2001.
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Bank, Grupo Condak, and five of Mexico's largest home-development companies. (Mexico's
Housing Market Study, 1999, p. 18) Businessmen in Mexico's housing market have seen the
potential profits of Su Casita, since it has lured all the major players and the IFC to invest in it.
Besides its regular servicing and lending activities, Su Casita has become the leader in
Mexico's infant securitization market. In June 2000, Su Casita issued the country's first
mortgage-backed securities with a US$3.7 million bond offering.0 ("Getting off the Ground,"
2001) Mexico's mortgage market is still too small for large securitization, however.
Figure 2:Share of Mexico's Mortgage Market
Loan Originations (2001)
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Source: Su Casita company website, 2002
GMAC
Like many diversified multinational corporations, General Motors offers a wide array of
services through its myriad subsidiaries. Although the average American consumer is most
familiar with General Motors for its cars, in 1996, GMAC Mortgage had over 540,000 customers
worldwide and serviced $54.5 billion in residential mortgages. (Business Wire, 10/22/1996)
GMAC entered the mortgage business in 1985 and the growth of the GMAC Mortgage Group
has been truly impressive. Earnings in 1999 were up 126 percent over 1998 as the group grew
aggressively with acquisitions of residential and commercial servicing portfolios, and real estate
operations. (Company web site: http://www.gmacfs.com/aboutus)
50 In this early attempt at securitizing mortgages, Pulte issued a very small amount of securities, just to test the
waters to see if the market could support such a sale, but a genuine MBS market in Mexico is several years
away. (Bernstein interview)
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General Motors Acceptance Corporation, the financing arm of GM, opened GMAC Mexico
in 1931 in Monterrey for automotive consumer financing and for commercial auto finance.
(GMAC company website) In 1996, GMAC established a separate subsidiary in Mexico called
GMAC Mexicana, dedicated to providing finance for consumers and businesses interested in
acquiring GM products. GMAC began to contemplate expanding its Residential Finance
operations to Mexico in 1994, but the devaluation of the peso in December 1994 halted the
initiative.
Even though GM residential finance arm had halted its initiative, in 1995, GMAC and
several other US companies applied for SOFOL status. According the Banco de Mexico, GE
Capital, Ford Motor Company, Chrysler, and GMAC" had all applied for SOFOL status to
become authorized lenders in Mexico. (Banco de Mexico website, http://www.banxico.org.mx)
Both General Motors and Ford Motor were granted licenses but originally used their
SOFOL status for auto financing52 , which was permissible under the law. (National Mortgage
News, 1997) Several of these US companies interested in participating in the SOFOL market
were companies that were not traditionally in the housing industry, including Ford Motor and
GMAC53. For the car companies, SOFOL status was a way for them to become involved in auto
financing in order to complement their primary business, and in the case of Ford, does not
appear to be a way to enter the mortgage market. However, for General Motors, its financing
wing, GMAC, seems to have set the path for its residential financing.
5 These four financial services companies were also the largest in the US. According the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve, these non-bank banks had the largest amount of financial assets in the US in 1993 with
GMAC at $105.1 billion, GE at $70.4 billion, Ford Motor Credit with $59 billion, and Chrysler Financial
Corporation with $24.7 billion in assets. (InfoLatina, November 1, 1995)
52 By 2001, SOFOLES were lending for mortgages, auto, personal, and small business loans with a total
outstanding credit of $6.9 billion. (Malkin, 2001)
5 Ford and GMAC have a combined $3 billion in outstanding auto loans under their SOFOLES. (Malkin, 2001)
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General Motors' Acceptance Corporation-Residential Funding Corporation, (GMAC-RFC),
began to reconsider investing in Mexico in September 1996. At a meeting of the Mortgage
Bankers Association's International Real Estate Finance Seminar in Costa Rica, Fred Rice of
GMAC-RFC, announced that they were "looking again" at Mexico. (National Mortgage News,
Sept. 30, 1996) This was 3 months after Delphi had initiated a housing program that would
generate $100 million in housing contracts, and 1 year after its parent company, GMAC had
secured SOFOL status.
As of 1999, the only two US companies directly investing in Mexican SOFOLES for
mortgage financing were Pulte Mortgage Corporation and GMAC-RFC. (Erb, Nov. 1999) It is
quite natural for these two giants of the US housing market to be interested in the Mexican
housing market. However, as a fully owned subsidiary of General Motors, GMAC-RFC's
involvement in Mexico's housing market is evidence to suggest that Delphi's decision to
participate in an employee housing program was not purely out of a desire to be a socially
responsible corporate citizen.
How important is the link to General Motors for its housing finance subsidiary? Keenan
Dammen, head of Global Strategic Alliances and Acquisitions at GMAC-RFC, was quite clear
about the importance of their parent company in RFC's overseas expansion. "If General Motors
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builds plants overseas, they'll have to get employees and have housing for these people."
(Timmons, 1998) Bruce Paradis, president of GMAC-RFC, agrees that being a subsidiary of GM
is "a tremendous advantage" and noted that RFC uses General Motors' name recognition and
customer foothold in Latin America to market its services, including mortgage securitization,
lending, and investment products. ("GMAC-RFC Reaches Overseas", October 13, 1997)
GMAC's involvement in the Mexican housing market can be viewed as a multi-pronged
approach. To briefly summarize GMAC's activities in the mortgage market:
1. Direct SOFOL lending through its Mexico subsidiary, Operadora Auritec and through
the newly formed GMAC Hipotecaria
2. Supply lines of credit for other SOFOLES, including Su Casita
3. Long-term vision of creating a secondary mortgage market
GMAC-RFC would make clear that the company's main efforts in Mexico were in securitization
of mortgage portfolios. (Hahn, 2000) GMAC does have a servicing company and a mortgage
bank in Mexico, but in 2000, RFC was really interested in issuing mortgage backed securities
(MBS) according to Alejandro Landa, the director of Mortgage Finance at RFC's Mexico
subsidiary. (Hahn, 2000) By spurring the construction industry and generating credits in
SOFOLES, Delphi was increasing the mortgage pool which would increase the potential of
GMAC-RFC to become involved in Mexico's infant mortgage-backed securities market.
RFC's long-term goal may be mortgage securitization, but they have started out with
direct lending through their SOFOL. By October of 2000, RFC would open GMAC Financiera
and GMAC Hipotecaria 4 and have an initial lending capital of $209 million for its housing
program. ("Residential Funding Corporation Starts Ops - Mexico." 2001) GMAC Hipotecaria
also teamed up other Mexican SOFOLES to launch a 2-year $280 home lending program in
2001.
Additionally, RFC is interested in providing capital for other SOFOLES, including Su
Casita. According to the regulatory arm of the Mexican stock exchange 55, the Registro Nacional de la
Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, Auritec Operadora, a Mexican subsidiary of GMAC-RFC, provided a $6
million line of credit for Su Casita. In September 2000, GMAC and Su Casita signed an
5 The delay in opening up the GMAC subsidiaries in Mexico until after 2000 may have been related to NAFTA
transition legislation that would have prevented GMAC from having more than 49% ownership in a SOFOL
prior to January 2000. By waiting until 2000, GMAC was assured 100% ownership in its new SOFOL.
5 Data obtained through a July 19, 2001 bond offering by Hipotecaria Su Casita. Su Casita's issued a document
to comply with the Mexican stock/bond exchange requirements for financial disclosure.
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agreement in which GMAC would make lines of credits available for Su Casita. (Su Casita
website.) This is a direct financial link between the GM subsidiary and the mortgage company
that GM contracted to service its housing program.
However, why did General Motors make an agreement with Pulte and Su Casita to
service Delphi's loans, instead of offering this business directly to GMAC-RFC? One hypothesis
is that General Motors wanted to avoid the appearance of direct profiteering from the employees'
housing program. Perhaps fearing criticism from activists if GMAC were directly financing its
employees' mortgages, GM partnered with Pulte.
A second possibility is that GM believed it could get greater rates of repayment through
an intermediary. Delphi Finance Director, Guillermo Guti6rrez, believes that by having another
independent company responsible for the loans, it removes a possible moral hazard in which
Delphi workers might not take repayment of a loan from their employer seriously. (Gutierrez
interview) This was the justification for having Grupo Condak as an intermediary for the down
payment assistance, but the rationale is applicable for the primary mortgage as well.
A third possibility of why RFC did not directly finance Delphi's worker housing was that
for strategic reasons, GMAC-RFC wanted to encourage outside investment in housing to
strengthen Mexico's mortgage market. Keenan Dammen noted that even though RFC has the
capital to invest in Mexico, "we need other companies to come with us" to build a viable
mortgage market. (Timmons, 1998) Because secondary mortgage markets require substantial
economies of scale, GMAC-RFC was aware that creating a robust and diverse primary mortgage
market was an absolute necessity if they had an eye towards securitization.
5.5 Private Vs Public Sector Incentives For The Housing Program
Three final points of analysis merit special attention: the private sector's incentives for
participating in the housing program; the motives of INFONAVIT for partnering with Delphi
and the construction company; and most interesting, the motives of FOVI, one of the most
respected and well-run government agencies, to subsidize SOFOLES and assure them such a
high rate of return on low-income income housing.
Examining the private sector's incentives for participation in the housing program is the
most clear-cut and is well founded in Neoclassical microeconomics. Firms are profit-maximizing
actors that will actively seek high profits such as the 40% rate of return of Su Casita.
Understanding how to take advantage of government subsidies such as FOVI programs is in the
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firm's interest to maximize its return. Both the Mexican construction firms and the US
multinationals understood how to cooperate with the public sector agencies in order to gain
financially.
Additionally, both Pulte and GMAC understood the potential financial benefits
associated with the first mover advantage. As one mortgage banker commented,
"US companies that wait the five years needed for the Mexican market to develop
further will be eight years behind the long-term players like Pulte, GE Capital and
GMAC-RFC, given the time it takes to establish a local presence. Not only are
there opportunities for high returns in the Mexican marketplace, but there are
synergistic opportunities to support existing US operations."
-Debra Erb of the Mortgage Bankers Association (Erb, Nov. 1999)
By being the first US companies to gain a foothold in the Mexican mortgage market, they could
establish themselves and dominate the market in its infancy. The synergistic opportunities that
Erb alludes to are cultivating special relationships with FOVI and INFONAVIT.
INFONAVIT's incentives to participate in the housing program are more complex. The
housing agency's sole purpose is to finance worker housing, and arguably, the agency had to
provide this housing regardless of a partnership with Delphi-GM. This partnership merely gave
Delphi employees preferential treatment in INFONAVIT's lottery process. Why then, did
INFONAVIT choose to form this exclusive relationship with General Motors and the
construction team? As noted earlier, personal connections between INFONAVIT director
Alfredo Del Mazo and the owner of Grupo Condak can partially explain INFONAVIT's
exclusive contract with the construction company.
Furthermore, the Mexican state has been a willing partner to the construction industry for
many years. Ricardo Mendez Silva argues that the state has promoted social housing as a means
of stimulating the construction industry. (Mendez Silva, 1991) More than just assisting an
important economic sector, construction is also an important employment generation
mechanism. The former director of INFONAVIT, Oscar Joffre, bragged that "The construction
of each house generates 5.3 jobs for each home." (Servicio Universal de Noticias, 11/3/1997) When
Delphi's housing program was announced, the Director of INFONAVIT would simultaneously
announce the job-creation statistics for the project. An INFONAVIT spokesman noted that the
600 million-peso program (US $79.5 million) would create 31,200 jobs directly, and another
12,000 jobs indirectly. (El Nacional, 08/23/1996) This investment would thus have a dramatic
impact on the regional economy. Creating jobs during the economic crisis was important
politically, all the better if the government could create jobs while addressing the housing crisis
and the crisis in the construction industry.
Another important political factor is that Alfredo Del Mazo had aspirations for higher
political office. Specifically, Del Mazo would become the PRI's main candidate for mayor of
Mexico City only 6 months after the announcement of the partnership with GM. Arguably, the
potential future mayor of the capital city would have many reasons to forge a special partnership
with a large multinational firm like GM, which was the largest employer in Mexico at the time.
Given General Motors' network of subsidiaries operating across Mexico, a shrewd politician
would understand the merits of establishing a good relationship with an important MNC. This is
a characteristic of INFONAVIT that has been documented in the past. "Analysis of
INFONAVIT demonstrates how administrators chose to produce expensive housing which
excluded the worst-off members of the institute's clientele in order to satisfy the private sector
and labor bosses, and thus advance their administrative careers." (Aldrete Haas, 1990, p. 18)
More than just personal ties between Del Mazo and Grupo Condak and political ties with
General Motors, the Mexican government was keen on preserving its relationship with General
Motors. After Alfredo Del Mazo left INFONAVIT in 1997 to run for office, the new director of
the housing agency56 was uncomfortable with the agreement with Delphi, believing it gave the
auto company an unfair advantage in the housing allocation process. (Crawford interview)
When the new INFONAVIT director attempted to annul the previous administration's
agreement with Delphi, the maquiladora was ready for the fight. Jack Smith, the president of
GM, made a phone call directly to President Zedillo to ensure that the program was not
cancelled. (Arelle interview; Guti6rrez interview) Zedillo's commitment to the program shows
that the housing program was not just based on personal connections between one
INFONAVIT director and a construction company, but rather, was part of a larger political
commitment to the meet the needs of large multinational corporations like General Motors.
Representatives from Delphi and Grupo Condak agree that the housing program would
not have been possible without the Mexican government. (Crawford interview; Arelle interview)
There is a solid case to show that the Mexican government did need to provide incentives for
56 The 1997 election made the opposition PAN a majority in the Mexican Congress for the first time in history.
President Zedillo of the PRI party was still in power and appointed a PRI politician, Oscar Joffre, as head of
INFONAVIT. However, some observers credit Joffre's reforms as a preemptive attempt to avoid PAN criticism
of the housing agency. (Angel interview) Angel hypothesizes that INFONAVIT was preparing itself for
increased scrutiny by the opposition members in Congress and decided to reform itself to avoid embarrassing
political battles.
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private firms to participate in the housing sector. The wave of defaults on private mortgages and
the moral hazard the government created by renegotiating payments with delinquent borrowers
established an atmosphere in the mortgage market that discouraged most private banks from
participation in the housing industry. (Pickering, 2000; Bernstein interview) Given the high
demand for housing and the government's inability to handle the housing crisis on its own, there
is a solid rationale for the Mexican government to provide some incentives to encourage private
sector participation in its struggling housing sector.
But why did the FOVI choose to subsidize US firms in the mortgage-finance sector?
One explanation has been attributed to NAFTA. However, the trade agreement may have forced
the liberalization of Mexico's financial markets, but it did not require FOVI to actively provide
subsidies to American companies investing in Mexico's mortgage finance sector.
A second explanation was that the severity of the financial crisis necessitated an inflow of
foreign capital to finance new housing construction. Eugene Towle of Softec, a Mexican real
estate consulting firm said, "Mexico offers wonderful real estate opportunities for foreign
investors, but we don't have the cash to capitalize on the opportunities.. .because our financial
system has slowed since 1994." (Taylor, 1998) Luring US capital into the Mexican housing
market was also a strategy that Manuel Zepeda, director of FOVI, specifically cited as a necessary
precursor to the creation of a secondary mortgage market.
For US investors interested in emerging markets, a risk premium is necessary to
compensate for the potential risk. It stands to reason that risky mortgage lending in Mexico
needs to offer higher returns to attract capital. Since the Mexican government wants to keep
low-income housing affordable, the housing agencies made a conscious decision to subsidize this
sector. Arguably, without interference by the Mexican government, mortgages would not be
available for low income Mexicans because they could not pay the interest rates that would
ensure the desired rates of return. However, is this level of government assistance necessary?
Could less extravagant incentives have attracted US capital to Mexico?
In practice, FOVI, the Mexican government, and the World Bank have attempted to
reduce subsidies to the private sector, but have been unsuccessful or have been overly optimistic
about the mortgage market. Since 1998, Manuel Zepeda of FOVI had been predicting that
mortgage-backed securities would help end government subsidized rates. (Moore, 1998)
However, securitization has not been the answer to the liquidity crunch in the housing market,
nor does it appear that these securities will be able to finance future housing projects.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Research
"The days of employer as landlord - benevolent, but controlling - are history. Today's employer
can be a purveyor of dreams by helping workers achieve homeownership."
-Ann D. McLaughlin, former US Secretary of Labor (McLaughlin, 2000, p. 2)
The former Secretary of Labor viewed employer-assisted housing as a modern
replacement of the company town, with great potential to improve the lives of workers. More
importantly, she believed that employers can (and should) play a role in helping workers gain
access to homes. Did Delphi's housing program live up to these expectations? More
importantly, based on the incentives of the firm for embarking on the program, is this a
sustainable and replicable housing program?
6.1 Findings
General Motors and its autopart subsidiary, Delphi Automotive, were applauded by the
press, the Business Roundtable Group, and the United States Office of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) for recent progressive work benefits in housing. Some firms are more
socially-conscious than others, and many are acutely aware of the need to improve public
relations to improve their image among the communities they work in, and more importantly,
among their customers. The positive benefits of the program are not limited to an increase in the
housing stock. Delphi was widely portrayed as a progressive US company that wanted to reward
its workers with desirable employee benefits.
It is clear that for the 6000 workers that received housing, the Delphi program was a
tangible benefit that improved the quality of life. For the lower income maquila workers, the
program helped workers gain access to credit and to formal sector housing for the first time in
their lives. For white-collar workers, even if they were dissatisfied with the quality of
INFONAVIT housing for their own personal consumption, the new housing unit was an
investment that could earn them extra income as rental units. Furthermore, even though many
of the workers that received INFONAVIT housing were not the lowest income workers,
nonetheless, many of them did need assistance to gain access to housing finance, and in this
manner, General Motors played an important role in negotiating with the Mexican housing
agencies.
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However, examining the counterfactual shows that the Delphi program did not make a
dramatic difference in housing production, but rather, affected the allocation of housing credits. Even
without the contractual relationship, INFONAVIT would have awarded those housing credits
regardless of the special arrangement with General Motors. Since GM's down payment
assistance helped leverage the housing agency's investment, it is possible that INFONAVIT was
able to make a modest increase in the number of housing credits, with the same amount of
money. The real difference is that 6000 houses were awarded to Delphi employees, and in many
cases, employees that earned too much money to qualify under regular circumstances. The
Delphi program therefore displaced other Mexican workers that would have received housing,
and many of the Delphi workers actually earned more than the INFONAVIT guidelines
permitted.
Additionally, the use of INFONAVIT contributions towards FOVI down payments
meant that Delphi's higher income salary workers displaced INFONAVIT workers in order to
finance FOVI homes. The implication of this is that the potential gains (in producing extra
housing) that INFONAVIT made with GM's down payment assistance were lost to FOVI in the
salary program. From the perspective of the workers, higher income salary workers were gaining
access to taxes they had paid and converting them into credits towards housing. From the
perspective of INFONAVIT, this leakage prevented the agency from awarding housing to lower
income workers and instead, assisted higher income workers in making down payments with
FOVI. The counterfactual is that workers that exceed INFONAVIT earning guidelines must
wait until retirement to gain access to their housing fund, but an exception was made for Delphi
employees.
From a financial standpoint, it is clear why the company preferred to offer housing
benefits instead of increasing wages. Delphi Automotive would have absorbed 100% of the cost
of an increase in wages. Negotiating housing benefits with INFONAVIT meant that the
government agency absorbed 82% of the cost of this benefit. This was estimated at $100 million
project and according to the Delphi finance department, only $8 million was actually distributed
in down payment assistance. This means Delphi paid only 8% of this employee benefit, and the
Mexican government was in essence subsidizing a private company's benefit program.
The main purpose of this thesis was to examine the incentives and motives for offering
employee-housing benefits. Although public relations and turnover have tangible benefits for the
company, I have rejected them as primary incentives for offering the housing program. General
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Motors was concerned about its public image, particularly with the increasing media attention on
multinationals during the NAFTA debate. The company also went to great measures to ensure
that the program received media attention by involving top-level officials in the program and
through an active public relations office. However, as we have seen, GM may have been more
concerned with generating a positive image for its shareholders and for US and Canadian unions,
and less concerned with actual consumers.
More importantly, I have shown that there is a gap between the image that the company
sought to portray and the actual program. Although the program was ostensibly started to get
Delphi's workers out of the colonias, and to show that General Motors is a good corporate citizen,
the reality is that most of Delphi's maquila workers still live in shantytowns and were excluded
from the program. Rather than proving that GM is a responsible corporation that cares for its
workers, the evidence shows that social consciousness was not a major factor that led to the
creation of the program.
The other conventional view about employee benefits is that reducing turnover is a major
incentive for firms to offer progressive work benefits such as housing. I have shown that there
may have been an expectation that the housing program would help increase employee retention,
but that the real reduction in turnover occurred before the program started. Furthermore, the
allocation of housing and the creation of the salary program shows that Delphi was more
concerned with reducing turnover for skilled workers than for unskilled line workers, despite the
fact that the majority of the firm's turnover problem lies with line workers that make up 79% of
the workforce in a maquiladora.
The alternative hypotheses that I proposed had mixed results. I have insufficient
evidence to prove that the firm had ulterior motives about the housing program's potential
impact on Mexican unionization. The company town mentality57 does not seem applicable to the
Delphi housing program because workers were free to leave the company as they wished and 800
housing recipients did just that. Furthermore, there does not appear to be enough of a
consciousness about labor organizing in Ciudad Juarez to suggest that Delphi would need to
discourage unionization. I found no evidence that Delphi workers in Judrez were interested in
unionizing, but this is partially due to the regressive nature of most of Mexico's official unions.
57 The days of the company town with absolute power may be over, but in the case of Delphi's housing program,
this is due largely to the significant role of the Mexican government in the program. It was INFONAVIT and
FOVI that controlled the workers' housing, not Delphi.
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Unlike in the company towns of the early 1900s where housing was used to control labor and
prevent strikes, the effect of the housing program on Mexican labor organizing appears to be
negligible.
However, there is a stronger case to show that General Motors used housing in Mexico
as a counter-propaganda mechanism to US and Canadian unions. The United Auto Workers
Union and the Canadian Autoworkers Union are active North American unions that have
effectively used strikes against General Motors and Delphi and have cried out against MNC's
treatment of their Mexican counterparts. General Motors actions in Mexico therefore have a
transnational effect on labor in the US and Canada.
This adds a more nuanced assessment of the firm's 'control' since EAH is no longer
about controlling labor in the same manner that it was 100 years ago in company towns. In
essence, GM used a game theory approach of pitting US and Canadian labor against Mexican
labor. By voluntarily offering benefits to Mexican workers, GM showed its US and Canadian
labor that it was in Mexico for the long haul and that GM's relocation to Mexico was not about
exploitation of labor. More importantly, the UAW and CAW were concerned about losing jobs
to their southern neighbors, and GM's response was clear: GM will continue to relocate to
Mexico where labor costs are lower and where organized labor is weak. GM could even afford to
finance employee housing in Mexico and still have significant labor cost advantages over its US
operations.
The most interesting result of my thesis investigation was the discovery that Mexican
construction interests and US banking and finance interests were the perhaps the primary
beneficiaries of the program. What is interesting here is not that the real estate sector was one of
the parties that most benefited, but the fact that a US company is what brought the parties
together. Arguably, Grupo Condak was capable of building the homes in Ciudad Judrez and had
plenty of experience in this market. However, could the small Chihuahuan company have
approached the GM giant on its own? Would the Delphi executives in El Paso have been as
amenable to this project if it had not been handed down from the desk of the General Motors
CEO? As a major homebuilder in the US, the Pulte Corporation was in a much better position
to approach its neighbor with this project, and brought the necessary capital to get Condak off
the ground. Similarly, since all real estate is local, Pulte did not have the local expertise to
proceed in the Judirez market without Grupo Condak. By partnering with Condak, Pulte could
benefit from lower costs because of Condak's existing network of builders.
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In determining if the program is replicable, it is important to recall the personal
connections between the construction company owner and the head of INFONAVIT.
Determining if the program would have gotten off the ground without Alfredo Del Mazo and
David Arelle's personal friendship is pure speculation, but at a minimum, the character of the
program may have been different in that a competitive bid process might have been used to
award the $100 million contract.
Determining if the program is replicable in other countries also requires examining the
political ties between the multinational corporation and the government. Interviews with Delphi
Mexico Chief Executive made it clear that the program would not have been possible without
General Motors. When the partnership was about to be cancelled in 1997, the President of GM
made a direct phone call to President Zedillo. These factors make it clear that not just any
company would have the necessary leverage to forge this type of commitment with the
government. Smaller companies might be interested in Employer-assisted housing, but it is not
clear that they could instigate dramatic change in the housing sector and negotiate with the
Mexican government in the same way that a multinational corporation like General Motors does.
The fact that General Motors' subsidiary, GMAC-RFC is directly involved in the Mexican
mortgage market and is investing in SOFOLES makes it clear that General Motors did expect to
receive a return on the $8 million contribution for employee down payments. This was not a
sunk cost, but rather an indirect investment in the future Mexican housing market. It is not just
an investment in its employees, but is an investment that would help generate business for
GMAC-RFC. Delphi-Mexico Chief Executive Lee Crawford said that he believed that the
company had gotten back its investment. Although he was ostensibly referring to the reduction in
training costs, the company's investment made returns elsewhere as well. Although there is
insufficient evidence to prove that Delphi received direct financial gain from the housing
partnership, (other than the alleged reduction in training costs associated with turnover) the
housing contract did serve to generate business for GMAC-RFC. By 2001, GMAC-RFC was
providing lines of credit to Hipotecaria Su Casita, the financial institution that services Delphi's
salary workers' homes.
There is also an element of hypocrisy in the involvement of multinational corporations in
the heavily subsidized Mexican housing market. Conservative MNCs oppose welfare states in the
US, but take advantage of the benefits abroad. Mexican government subsidies to foreign firms
have been an important factor in relocations to Mexico, (Carrillo, 1994; Dombois 1985; Jenkins,
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1984) but the continued reliance on these government benefits when they are attacked as
distortionary measures in the States is striking. Additionally, given the recent popularity of
Neoliberal economics, the World Bank and IFC subsidies to the Mexican housing sector (and to
US companies) are also hypocritical.
Additionally, the role of NAFTA in initiating financial sector reform and in liberalizing
the Mexican financial markets can be credited with helping to increase foreign investment in the
housing market. The creation of SOFOLES was an unintended consequence of NAFTA that
made investment in Mexico's mortgage industry a profitable enterprise. Other external factors
that increased interest in Mexico's housing industry include the IFC loan to Hipotecaria Su Casita
to establish the SOFOL and loans to FOVI to increase lending and help cover the costs of
creating a secondary mortgage market. Both of these interventions show that there was
substantial outside interest in the Mexican mortgage industry, and it is unclear if the housing
program could have been successful without NAFTA regulations and without IFC support of US
businesses.
Finally, it appears that it was INFONAVIT and FOVI who bore the most responsibility
for the program, and who may have received the smallest portion of the benefits. Both agencies
had to invest in worker housing regardless of the partnership with GM and Pulte-Condak, so it
was not necessarily interested in financial gain. Ultimately, INFONAVIT's gains from the public-
private partnership were short lived and limited to minor political benefits, while General Motors
and the Pulte Corporation appear to be the true beneficiaries of the program, reaping both
political and financial benefits.
6.2 Policy Implications
The main purpose of this essay was to examine how the public-private partnership
formed in Ciudad Juirez and what motivated the actors to initiate the housing program. Even
though it was not a primary goal to examine the policy implications of the program, it is
nonetheless interesting to reflect on how this program fits into overall housing policy. The bulk
of this paper might inspire cynicism since the main beneficiaries were real estate developers, US
sources of capital, and big business. Additionally, the workers that did benefit from the program
are not the neediest workers in Mexico. But rather than focusing on negative consequences and
the shortcomings of the project, it is more useful to analyze implications on policy for future
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housing projects, for other government subsidies, and the implications for MNCs doing business
abroad.
The level of subsidies that the Mexican government offers in the low-income housing
market and the healthy profit margin for the private sector should be re-examined. Although a
risk premium is necessary to attract capital into the Mexican housing sector, it is not clear that the
government should be using its scarce resources to generate a 38% rate of return for commercial
SOFOLES. Generally, the rate of return on an investment is correlated to the level of risk, and
the Mexican housing industry is a risky endeavor. However, in this case, FOVI is taking on 50%
of the risk and is providing subsidies for loan origination and servicing. For private firms, this
means attractive returns with limited risks. Not only does this type of arrangement distort the
real mortgage market, but it also increases the potential that predatory lenders will enter the
heavily subsidized market. Although many people might believe that subsidized housing is a
good investment for the Mexican government and that it is pulling low-income Mexicans out of
poverty, the government should re-examine the level of subsidies it offers with an eye to luring
capital and investment into the housing sector, but at the lowest possible cost to the government.
Another issue to examine is the Mexican minimum wage structure, which has artificially
kept wages down to attract foreign investment in Mexico. Encouraging foreign direct investment
is the primary goal of this policy that has been successful at generating employment opportunities
for Mexicans, but has simultaneously depressed that standard of living of many Mexicans. The
annual minimum wage increases have not kept up with inflation in the past decade, which has
eroded the purchasing power of Mexicans. For US companies in Mexico, fluctuations in the
exchange rate and inflation have compensated the companies for any nominal increases in wages,
and have essentially allowed US companies to maintain a stagnant wage rate. The low wages had
repercussions on Mexican workers that could not qualify for government subsidized housing and
who could not access credit through Delphi's housing program.
The current Mexican government's policy may increase the supply of housing due to the
generous subsidies for housing construction and mortgage origination. However, until Mexican
workers can afford to pay for these houses, there will be a mismatch between the supply and
demand. Studies of the Mexican housing market frequently cite "the huge unmet demand" for
housing, however this is not a real demand because workers cannot afford the housing. What
many analysts call "demand" is actually a desire for affordable, formal sector housing. Until
workers reach a certain income level, however, they cannot be considered as consumers in the
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housing market. If the Mexican government wants to use housing as a poverty alleviation
measure it will first have to increase the number of Mexicans who can genuinely afford it.
Facilitating access to credit is a necessary step in the process, but it is insufficient because it
excludes so many formal sector workers.
The allocation of the housing credits within Delphi also merits special attention.
Reviewing the wage and employee data at SEC, one of Delphi's maquilas in Ciudad Judrez,
revealed that 79% of the factory's hourly workers could not qualify for the housing credits
because they did not earn enough money. Conversely, this means that those workers whose
incomes were in the top 21% were the employees that actually benefited from the program.
Furthermore, the creation of the salary program for office personnel indicates that Delphi was
just as concerned (if not more so) with rewarding its skilled workforce as it was with providing
housing benefits for the 'poor.'
Delphi's internal allocation system of the housing credits has important implications for
the policy world. Government housing agencies should be cautious in regulating the role of
developers and construction companies in the housing allocation process. Although ostensibly it
was Delphi and General Motors that did preliminary qualifications for the housing credits,
ultimately, GM was influenced by contractual arrangements with Grupo Condak that limited the
number of houses targeting the poorest workers. Furthermore, the construction company and
the financing agency (Su Casita) were both motivated to allocate the housing credits to the top of
Delphi's income distribution which conflicts with the target clients of INFONAVIT and FOVI.
Given the scale of Mexico's housing crisis, this partnership idea has not taken off as some
might have hoped. Only four or five other maquiladoras have followed Delphi's lead, and few
have gotten the media attention that the press has ravished on Delphi-General Motors. The
other maquiladoras that have worked with INFONAVIT have generally signed contracts for less
than a thousand homes. Sony Magneticos de M6xico, Soriana and Vishay Vale Electronics are
other maquiladorasy that would provide worker housing and lucrative construction contracts for
Pulte and Grupo Condak. The agreement with Sony produced more than 500 homes in Nuevo
Laredo, and Vishay would add another 600 homes in Ciudad Juirez. (Poole, 1999)
However, even though the idea has not taken off among maquilas, the Fox
administration has renamed the savings program and launched a "new" savings program called
Cuenta Ahorro Hogar. Corporaci6n Geo, the largest homebuilder in Mexico that dominates the
Mexico City market, is active in the new program and is the largest recipient of housing credits.
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Geo has partnered with National Chamber of Commerce, which represents 2000 companies in
Mexico. Corporaci6n Geo has built 24,000 homes under the program", with almost 50% of the
homes in the state of Mexico. The critical difference is that the new INFONAVIT
administration under Fox is targeting lower income workers that earn between 3-4 minimum
wages. The Delphi program had targeted workers that earned between 1.7-10 minimum wages,
with a significant portion of the credits going to upper income households.
The policy implication here is that it appears that INFONAVIT has recognized the
housing allocation problems that occurred with the Delphi pilot program. The new
administration has addressed the problem by targeting lower-income households and setting
thresholds for higher income workers. In the year 2002, INFONAVIT's goal is to award 275,000
homes, and 30% of the homes will be for households earning less than 4 minimum wages. (V61a
interview)
Furthermore, if the Mexican government is really interested in making housing available
to the poorest workers, then diversifying the financing options is one way to increase access to
credit. Although INFONAVIT has a line of credit that is designed to help low-income families
take out small loans and make progressive improvements in their existing housing stock, in
practice, INFONAVIT has not encouraged workers to use these loans. The Delphi housing
program provided only finished housing units for workers, and effectively excluded the lowest-
income workers. By facilitating access to $1000-$2000 loans so that workers can make additions
to their homes or improve services on their lots, Delphi could have made a tangible difference in
the lives of its workers that lived in the informal sector. The current emphasis on finished
housing units is beneficial to construction companies and financing agencies, but is not
necessarily in the best interest of the lowest-income workers that are excluded from the formal
sector mortgage market.
6.3 Further Research
There were many unresolved questions that this research could not address. One of the
unresolved questions is whether or not Employer-assisted housing is feasible in other developing
countries. EAH varies in developing countries and is frequently dormitory housing for factory
58 According to the Mexico City construction company, Binomio Ahorro Hogar was the pilot program, which
did not take off in the border zone. However, in Mexico City, the new savings program, Cuenta Ahorro Hogar
has been more successful and four major construction companies (Geo, Urbi, Sadasi and Consorcio Ara) have
been active in this market. (V61a interview)
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workers, temporary housing for migrant agricultural workers, or temporary housing for miners in
remote locations. In developing countries, home ownership schemes sponsored by employers
remains relatively rare. This research has shown that two main reasons why the housing program
occurred in Mexico were because of large government subsidies and because of the important
role of a powerful MNC in negotiating with the government. However, in the absence of these
two conditions, is employer assisted housing a viable alternative for addressing worker housing
shortages?
Additionally, this thesis raises more questions than it answers in terms of the
transnational effects of labor movements. Can a company's labor unions in one country affect
the company's treatment of its workers in another country? There was weak evidence to suggest
that General Motors concern with US and Canadian labor may have led it to offer housing
benefits in Mexico, but this question remains unresolved.
More research could also be conducted on the role of diversified MNCs in affecting
government policies abroad. One does not normally consider autopart manufacturers as part of
the housing industry, but all three major carmakers with operations in Mexico submitted
applications to become finance institutions in 1994. More important, one does not normally
consider autopart manufacturers as banking/financial institutions. At a minimum, activists,
regulators, and policy makers need to see them as such. The nature of globalization and the
increasingly diversified activities of so many corporations have changed the way that companies
do business. GM does not go to Mexico just to produce cars; it goes to Mexico to make money.
How can developing countries regulate foreign companies that are expanding in every
sector of their economies? This is the million-dollar question with no obvious answers. One
thing we do know is that regulation and oversight of business would be inadequate if
governments (and activists) took programs like Delphi's housing credits at face value and fail to
examine the complex motivations and interlocking firm activities and political networks that
brought this program to life. Recognizing that GM was involved in mortgage finance might have
made regulators more cautious and made them think twice about allowing Grupo Condak and
Delphi to play such a prominent role in the housing allocation process. The fact that real estate
interests and big business are the real winners should come as no surprise, although it is perhaps
disappointing that a program that appeared to have so much promise is really just business as
usual. Furthermore, researchers and activists should be wary of projects that seem too good to
be true.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Delphi and GM Facilities and
Delphi Operations in 1998
Operations Worldwide
Worldwide Manufacturing facilities 208
Technical Centers 27
World wide employees 204,000
World-wide annual revenues $32 billion
Plants in Mexico 53
Workers in Mexico 72,000
Delphi Factories in Cd. Juarez 15
Delphi workers in Cd. JuAirez 23,000
Source: Soden, Dennis. Delphi Automotive Systems: Histog, Labor Issues, and its Role in CiudadJudreZ. 1999.
General Motors
Worldwide Manufacturing Facilities
Plants worldwide
34 countries
147
GM Mexico Operations
Total Mexico GM employment: 13,342
Ramos Arizpe - Passenger Car Assembly
Hourly employees:
Salary employees: 5284
Year Opened: 474
Union: 1981
Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Mexico
(CTM)
Silao- Truck Assembly
Hourly employees: 2991
Salary employees: 245
Year Opened: 1994
Union: Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Mexico
(CTM)
Toluca, Mexico -Truck Assembly
Hourly employees: 2246
Salary employees: 320
Year Opened: 1994
Union: Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Mexico
(CTM)
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Appendix 2: Map of Mexico
Cities with Delphi plants: Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, Matamoros, Monterrey, Saltillo
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DELPHI
Automotive Systems
Programa Binomio
Ahorro-Hogar
IN FO NAVIT
Eu'T
Condak
Appendix 3: "Hourly" Program Housing Sizes
Type I
Type II
Type III
Type IV
Type V
48.8 m2 lot
58.8 m2 lot
78 m2 lot
120 m2 lot
120 m2 lot
40 m2
40 m2
52 m2
54 m2
60 m2
construction
construction
construction
construction
construction
Source: Delphi Personnel Department Slide Show Presentation, but lot sizes were adapted to the specifications provided by the construction company, Grupo
Condak in a January 30, 2002 phone interview with the sales department.
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M
Appendix 4: Delphi and General Motors - Major Union Confrontations
1984 Canadian autoworkers (CAW) form their own union after years of being represented by
the United Auto Workers (UAW). "Since then, car companies have tried to use the split
to their advantage by threatening to move work to Canada, which has lower labor costs
that the US." (WSJ, 3/25/1996)
1994 Feb - GM workers threaten strike in Flint, Michigan for 7 factory complex (WSJ,
02/09/1994)
August - GM strike in Anderson, IN shuts down 8 assembly plants. (fournal of Commerce,
08/26/1994)
1996 March - 10 day strike by 3000 GM workers at 2 Delphi plants in Dayton, OH. Strikes
forced lay-offs of 90,000 autoworkers in US and shut down half of its 29 assembly plants.
(fournal of Commerce, 03/15/1996)
The strike at 2 of Delphi's brake parts plants forced the shutdown of "virtually all of
GM's North American operations" and cost $900 million. (WSJ, 06/03/1996)
April - GM obtains a Federal court order to end a UAW wildcat strike of 1800 workers
in Lordstown, OH at a GM assembly plant. This strike was prompted by GM's dismissal
of a local union leader for committing fraud. (NIYT, 04/17/1996)
October - 28,500 Canadian autoworkers threaten strikes. Canada's parts plant supply US
assembly plants. (journal of Commerce, 10/02/1996) 15,000 GM workers walked out in
Oshawa, Ontario, and another 11,000 employees at 4 other plants threaten to strikes.
(Vashington Post, 10/04/1996)
November - 2750 UAW members strike at GM's Indianapolis metal stamping plant.
4800 workers strike at GM's truck assembly plant in Janesville, WI. Strikes in IN and WI
caused 19,000 GM workers to be idle at 7 GM assembly plants. (Washington Post,
11/03/1996) Three-week CAW strike in October cause an additional 18,958 US workers
to remain idle due to shortages. (Washington Post, 11/03/1996)
1997 May - 7 week UAW strike in GM's Oklahoma City plant. The cost of re-launching the
plant after strike would cost millions. (NYT, 05/23/97)
1998 June - 54-day strike. 10,000 United Auto Workers strike and an additional 25,000 remain
idle. (WSJ, 06/12/1998) Leads to a loss of $ 214 million in the quarter and cost the
company $2 billion. (Soden, 1999)
* In US, Canada and Mexico, strike at the 2 plants in Flint, MI leaves 80,000 workers
idle at a cost of between $50 million - $75 million per day. (WSJ, 06/18/1998)
Source: Selection compiled by authorfrom headlines of various news sources. This is not an exhaustive list of GM or Delphi
union confrontations.
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Appendix 5: Timeline of Investments in the Mexican Housing Industry
1989 -Auritec (Mexican financial firm) formed by Alejandro Schwedhelm. Auritec is the oldest
servicing company in Mexico and the first servicer to prepare loan portfolios for sale by
FOBAPROA/VVA, Mexico's agency responsible for disposing of troubled bank
portfolios.
1994- Devaluation of the Mexican peso spurs a financial crisis and private banks stop mortgage
lending. The SOFOL is formed as a non-depository mortgage vehicle
1994 - Hipotecaria Su Casita, a Mexican SOFOL is founded by Manuae Cameos
1995 - Pulte Mortgage becomes a shareholder in Hipotecaria Su Casita with a 23% stake
1995 - (November) GMAC financing opens offices in Mexico, with attention focused on
automobile leasing
1995 - (November) According to a Nov. 1, 1995 report on Mexico's financial system, General
Motor, Ford Motor, and Chrysler Corporation had all independently solicited approval to
form SOFOLES, non depository mortgage institutions created in the wake of the
Mexican financial crisis.
1996- Grupo Condak is in a financially precarious situation following the 1994 financial crisis. It
seeks outside capital to keep the business alive, and partners with Pulte Corporation. At
the time, Pulte was the largest homebuilder in the US.
1996 - (June) General Motors and INFONAVIT housing agreement signed
1996 - (September) GMAC-RFC, subsidiary of General Motors, announces at the 3rd annual
international real estate finance seminar that it is looking into working in Mexico
1997- First Delphi-GM houses are handed over to employees
1997- Financiamento Azteca receives approval for administering FOVI loans in July. Su Casita
eventually acquires Azteca.
1997- Hipotecaria Su Casita qualifies to administer FOVI loans (October).
1998 - (March 12) GMAC-RFC purchases Mexican mortgage finance firm Auritec
1998 - (August) The World Bank and FOVI closed a deal for a 3-year loan worth $500 million,
which will be used to cover the costs of developing a secondary market in mortgage-back
secunties.
2000 - 15 SOFOLES in Mexico originate more than 95% of private sector mortgages. By 2000,
Hipotecaria Su Casita has 56 offices in Mexico
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2000 - (April) GMAC Mexicana
2000 - (June) Su Casita issues its first mortgage-backed securities offering of $18 million. This
was Mexico's first transaction in mortgage-back securitizations.
2000 - (September) Hipotecaria Su Casita and GMAC sign a line of credit agreement
2000 - (October) GMAC-RFC's affiliate, GMAC Trade Finance, Inc., provides revolving lines of
credit to qualified Mexican businesses in order to provide financing for purchases of U.S.
exports. GMAC-RFC executed an insurance agreement with the Export-Import Bank of
the United States (the Export-Import Bank) that will serve as the cornerstone for the
innovative trade finance program.
2000 - (December) - Operadora Auritec, subsidiary of General Motors (GMAC-RFC) qualifies
for administration of FOVI loans
2000 - (December) Su Casita acquires Financiamento Azteca and becomes the largest loan
originator in Mexico with this strategic purchase.
2000 - In a July 2001 Su Casita Bond offering, Su Casita indicated that it had a $50 million pesos
line of credit from Financiera Auritec, a GMAC subsidiary in Mexico
2001 - (March) GMAC-RFC opens revolving credit lines for Mexican companies. Financed with
assistance US Export-Import Bank
2001 - Jose Landa, General Director of GMAC Hipotecaria, announces the company will team
up with Mexican SOFOLES to launch a 2-yr, $280 million home lending program. (Get
real date - found in Business Week online, April 30, 2001)
2001- (Sept. 25) IFC, a branch of the World Bank Group, announces it has acquired a minority
stake in Hipotecaria Su Casita work $10.5 million. This move is intended to help
development of the financial sector and assists Mexican families in house buying
2002- Mexican housing Market dominated by Consorcio Hogar, Consorcio Ara, and Grupo Geo.
The Mexico City daily, "El Economista" reports that Pulte Homes is looking to conquer
the Mexican market though strategic acquisition. And expects to build 9,700 homes in
2002, a 30% increase from the previous year. (Economista, 01/22/2002)
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